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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In a democracy, propaganda and persuasion are signifi -
cant forces. The propagandist and special pleader has at his 
command instruments which help determine the policies and com-
position of the government . In the United States the use of 
propaganda by politicians is a useful and necessary function. 
The communication of this information helps to keep the public 
advised on the vital issues which they are expected to weigh 
when they vote on candidates for office. 
Propaganda both reflects and forms public opinion. 
The American political parties attempt to regulate many of 
their appeals according to prevailing sentiments . At the same 
time these parties arouse certain views and opinions in the 
populace . The stimulation of interest and controversy as a re-
sult of t he propagation of opposing tenets of political thought 
are necessary if a democracy is to function. According to 
Lasswell: 
When public opinion is alert and determined in support of 
the proper permanent and provisional demands, there is a 11 healthy two-way relationship between opinion and govern-
ment. Streams of opinion which originate outside govern-
ment, and beneath the upper officialdom, act openly upon 
government, and especially upon the higher officials . 
Government, in turn, acts upon the people. The two - way 
connection of opinion and policy is the distinguishing 
II 
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mark of democracy. 1 
Although propaganda has probably been used ever since 
the human animal first learned to communicate through verbal 
symbols, the term originated in the early seventeenth century. 11 
In 1622 Pope Gregory XV created a collegium de propaganda fide, 
an institute for the propagation of the Catholic faith. This 
organization had authority over the liturgical books, the re-
ports of bishops and other officials abroad and the carrying 
on of religious education. 
During the last forty years, however, the word 11 propa-
ganda 11 has acquired evil connotations. In the period of World 
War I, Lord Northcliffe and the British used propaganda to 
hasten United States participation in the conflict. When these 
activities were finally revealed after that war, it created re-
vulsion in a great part of the American public. 
Nazism displayed one of history 1 s most flagrant exam-
ples of the unscrupulous use of propaganda during World War II. 
Geobbels achieved notoriety through the association of his name 
with the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda. Public acquaintance with 
this Nazi propaganda created more distrust in that word. As 
William Albig comments: 
During the World War, it acquired the sinister conno-
tation of special pleading, that fro~ concealed sources, 
distributed untrue or only partly true information by de-
1Harold D. Lasswell, Democracy Through Public Opinion 
(New York: George Banta Publishing Company, 1941}, p. 18. 
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vious routes. Popular emotional revulsion to the idea of 
such propaganda was pronounced.l 
Talking about the degredation of the word 11 propaganda 11 
and how it should be used , Charles A. Siepmann says; 
The word propaganda has fallen on evil days . As far as 
popular usage is concerned , its reputation by now is prob-
ably lost irretrievably , for its connotation is almost in-
var i ably sinister or evil . This is a pity, for in the 
struggle for men's minds it is a weapon of great potential 
value. I ndeed, in the race against time that we are run-
ning, its constructive use is indispensable. But even 
though its popular reputation is thus sullied, the student 
of propaganda must know i t for what it is --a term honor-
able in or i gin and, even today, neutral in tone . 2 
It is i n this neutral sense that we will use the word 
11 propagandatt in the study of Harold Ickes' persuasion . This is 
done because we cannot consider I ckes a propagandist in the 
same sense that Hitler and Geobbels were. Although Ickes used 
techniques of propaganda that we find in the Nazi propaganda 
and, for that matter, in any mass persuasion , the intentions 
and communicat i ons ' content of Ickes, the liberal, were poles 
apart from Hitler, the dictator . 
In attempting to define propaganda, we might say that 
it is a use of language aimed at large masses of people . Smith, 
Lasswell, and Casey, reporting on propaganda, state : 
It sends words, and other symbols such as pictures , 
through the radio, press, and film, where they reach huge 
1william Albig, Public Opinion (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc., 1939}, p . 284. 
2charles A. Siepmann, Radio , Television and Society 
(New York: Oxford University Press , 1950) , p. 173. 
audiences. The intention of the propagandist is to in-
fluence mass attitudes on controversial issues . l 
4 
This definition makes no attempt to discriminate between 11 good 11 
and 11 bad 11 propaganda; nor does it attempt to distinguish be -
tween the 11 truth 11 and 11 untruth 11 of the material which the prop -
agandist disseminates. Propaganda is 11 goodu or ubad 11 accord-
ing to our judgment of the end which it seeks, and the methods 
it employs . 
The success of a presidential candidate, both in get-
ting into office and then the procurement of public approval 
of his policies once in office, is dependent, to a great extent, 
upon the degree of proficiency that he and his supporters pos-
sess in the utilizing the techniques of propaganda and per-
suasion . Examination of the elements of propaganda and per-
suasion used by political figures is relevant to the study of 
communication . Various investigations into the use of prop-
aganda by political organizations2 and by political figures3 
with its effect on people4 have been made. These studies are 
,, -----------------------
1Bruce Lannes Smith, Harold D. Lasswell and Ralph D. 
Casey, Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion (Prince-
ton: Pri nceton University Press, 1946), p. 1. 
2Harwood L. Childs, Propaganda and Dictatorship (Prince-
ton : Princeton University Press , 1936}, p . 1. 
3ulric Bell, 11 The Democratic Diplomacy of Secretary 
Hull, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, II (January, 1938), pp. 36-
47. 
4Edward Yarnall Hartshorne, 11 Reaction to the Nazi 
Threat: A Study of Propaganda and Culture Conflict, 11 Public 
Opinion Quarterly, V (Winter, 1941), pp. 625-639 . 
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a vital part of the body of knowledge in the social sciences . 
The success of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the ''New 
Dealersn in the 1932, 1936, 1940 and 1944 presidential cam-
paigns was partly due (like other successes in presidential 
campaigns) to the use of persuasion and propaganda by Roose -
velt and his supporters. In the book Champion Campaigner : 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harold F. Gosnell states : 
5 
In his years of campaigning Roosevelt learned how language 
symbols could be manipulated to influence behavior . He 
II 
developed a great feeling for words and the effect that 11 
they would have upon his audiences. He devised many slo -
gans for which millions of people carne to have sentimen-
tal attachments . In a land of free enterprise, he was one 
of the nation ' s best salesrnen . l 
During the Roosevelt administration the Secretary of 
Interior was Harold L. Ickes. He was considered an important 
political leader of the New Deal and one of the ablest admin -
istrators of that period . 11 Before the New Deal had been many 
months in existence Ickes was handling some of its biggest 
jobs.n 2 
The persuasion and propaganda that Ickes used to sup -
port the Roosevelt administration was one of the factors which 
contributed to the continued success and popularity of that 
president. An example of this support took place on December, 
1Haro l d F. Gosnell, Champion Carnpaigner:Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 223 . 
2unofficial Observer pseud. ,John Franklin Carter , The 
New Dealers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1934}, p . 188. 
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1937 and January, 1938. At this time, President Roosevelt ac -
quiesced in a campaign undertaken by Corcoran, Cohen, Ickes, 
Hopkins and Robert H. Jackson for the purpose of blaming the 
depression on big business . Ickes was one of the main speakers 
in this ''trust - bustingn offensive. 1 
The task of this thesis is to examine the propaganda 
and persuasion that Harold L. Ickes used. The hope is that 
this examination will not only provide some insight into the 
workings of these political tools as they were used in the 
Roosevelt administration but also will help reveal Ickes 1 phil -
osophy on the use of propaganda and persuasion . 
To facilitate a broad and complete view of this subject, 
the following source materials were used for the study: 
l. Personal documents written by Harold L . Ickes dur -
ing his political career . 
2. Public speeches, books and articles by Harold L . 
Ickes. 
3. Commentaries, both laudatory and denunciatory, about 
Harold L. Ickes by his contemporaries and later his -
torians. 
This material was examined, collated and correlated so 
that the various concepts and techniques of propaganda and per-
suasion of Harold L. Ickes could be revealed. 
Ickes is viewed in this thesis not only as a propagan -
1Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie (New York: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 1952), pp. 10'(, Io8. 
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dist for Roosevelt and the Roosevelt administration but also 
as a person interacting within a period of history and within 
a particular environment. Since a study of a political fig-
ure's persuasion would be meaningless without correlation with 
his personal history and environment, it was essential that 
this broad view be taken. This method of examination shows 
how his patterns of behavior and thought were developed and re-
veals the effects of the actions of his contemporaries on his 
persuasion. It was with these thoughts in mind that the in-
vestigation into various "case histories'' of Harold L. Ickes r 
persuasion is preceded by a study of his private and public 
history, his personality, and the roles that he played in the 
Roosevelt administration. 
This thesis might be considered as being divided into 
three main parts. First, six strategic areas of Ickes' phil -
osophy of persuasion are examined in Chapter II. In Chapter 
III we view Ickes' personal history and environment to provide 
insight into the development of his propaganda philosophy. 
Finally we study three ''case histories 11 ; concerning the Public 
Works Administration, Conservation and Big Business (Chapters 
IV, V, VI); relating them with the six strategic areas of Ickes' 
philosophy of persuasion. 
,..----
CHAPTER II 
STRATEGIC AREAS OF ICKES' PERSUASION 
PHILOSOPHY 
Ickes' Belief in the Importance 
of Propaganda 
As evidenced by various comments in his secret diary, 
we can see that Harold Ickes was quite aware and concerned 
about propaganda in practically every phase of information 
that reached the public. When he went to see the play 11 Abe 
Lincoln of Illinois 11 starring Raymond Massey, he viewed it as 
being good New Deal propaganda . 1 On the other hand , when he 
saw a particular motion pic ture in 1937 which featured Eddie 
Cantor, he felt that it was plainly propaganda against the 
8 
President's New Deal and expressed surprise that anyone would 
have ventured to put it on and that the Hays office would have 
permitted it to be put on. At this time he also commented on 
the seriousness of a situation when the mass of the metropoli -
tan newspapers, the radio and the newsreels and even the mov -
ing - picture promoters joined in an "assault" on the Adminis -
tration and the New Deal. 2 
Ickes felt the importance and necessity for govern -
lHarold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
Vol. II: The Inside Struggle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1953) ' p . 554. 
2Ibid., pp. 245, 246. 
I 11--
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ment to take an active part in propaganda to maintain nation-
al esprit de corps and morale . In a speech to the National 
Advisory Council on Radio in Education at the Chicago World's 
Fair in 1934, he stressed the role that radio could play in 
making the nation feel and act as a unit. 1 
In 1939 he expressed his interest, to the President, 
in the government's setting up a complete broadcasting system 
reaching into every part of the country as well as abroad, 
particularly to the Spanish-American countries, to counteract 
2 German propaganda. He felt that pro-Nazi sentiment in such 
places as the German communities of Nebraska could be better 
combatted, not by platform speeches, but by sending into these 
communities citizens of German birth or descent who could talk 
to their fellow Germans in their own language and against 
their own background.3 
Again in 1941, he saidthat the Germans had proved con-
elus ively that one of the most potent forces in a war is that 
part that built and maintained morale . He also expressed re-
gret at the United States not having done much in this area . 4 
1The New York Times Magazine, October 9, 1934, p. 2 . 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, p. 375. 
3Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
Vol. III: The Lowering Clouds (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
19 54) ' p . 3 6 8. 
4 Ibid . , p . 4 2 6 . 
0 
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In conversations with President Roosevelt he stressed 
the importance of setting up a counter - propaganda agenc y in 
order to build up American morale against the German threat. 
Ickes said, in his diary, that this was just as important as 
manufacturing airplanes and other weapons. 1 He felt that the 
building of morale through propaganda was a matter of applied 
psychology and that it required special preparation . 2 
Ickes always stressed the importance of propaganda in 
politics and always believed in starting campaigns early. He 
was the first person of political importance to "push" a third 
term for Roosevelt and he constantly suggested to the Presi-
dent during 1940 to keep up an active campaign on this issue.3 
When Wendell Willkie was nominated to run in the 1940 
presidential race, Ickes suggested that the Pre s ident start 
a vigorous campaign early to oppose Wi l lkie. Roosevelt did 
not heed Ickes' suggestion and when Willkie subsequently began 
to gain ground, Ickes expressed annoyance that his plan was 
not be ing followed. He declared that Roosevelt could h ave led 
Willkie from the very beginning if a campaign had been started 
immediately . 4 
1 Ibid. , p. 458. 
2Ibid. , p. 519 . 
3Ibid., p. 324. 
4 Ibid . , p. 361. 
ll 
Ickes believed that the newspapers were the best means 
available to him through which he could answer charges against 
his administration. 1 His staff included several former news -
papermen. One of their chief objectives was to make sure that 
radio addresses made by him were well publicized in the press. ~ 
Since Ickes wanted his position well publicized, he fought for 
radio time, extensive radio coverage and arranged advance pub -
licity for his broadcasts. He also selected controversial su~ 
jects and provocative speech titles such as: 11 Landon Over To - II 
peka 11 and 11 Nations In Nightshirts' ' , to help attract both radio 
and newspaper audiences. 2 
Although there is no evidence in his private records 
presently available to us that reveal efforts on the part of 
Ickes to have his writings published in mass circulation maga -
zines, analysis shows that he did have many articles pub -
lished in such periodicals as: Collier's, Th e American Maga-
zine and The Saturday Evening Post (all, mass circulation maga -
zines). He was a prolific writer and besides many magazine 
and newspaper articles, he also wrote books, including: The 
New Democracy (1934), Back to Work (1935), America ' s House of 
lHarold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L . Ickes, 
Vol. I : The First Thousand Days ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1953}' p. 3 3. 
2William Scott Nobles, "A Rhetorical Study of the Pub -
lic Speaking of Harold L. Ickes in the 1936 Presidential Cam-
paign " (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uni -
versity, 1955), p. 66. 
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Lords (1939), Fightin 1 Oil (1943), and The Autobiography of a 
Curmudgeon (1943). As we shall see in the following pages, 
all of these publications served Ickes as important communi -
cation mediums. 
Creating an Image 
We will discuss, in connection with the Public Works 
Administration, the honesty of Ickes . The appellation of 
"Honest Harold" no doubt helped to create a favorable public 
image for him . He did express, however, his dislike for that 
title because he felt that it made him a target for "sharp -
shooters".1 It seems that he felt uncomfortable in a "goody-
goody" role and preferred the public image of a crusty, can-
tankerous, vile - tempered but trustworthy curmudgeon. The ex-
travagant and bellicose manner which he displayed, supported 
this image. His brusque manner and emphasis upon 11 business" 
methods created the public picture of a hardened fighter f or 
honesty in government. Sitting shirtsleeved at his desk, re -
ceiving t h e long lines of visitors whose questions he answered 
sharply and without waste of words or benefit of "back- slap -
ping", as he leaned forward among the papers and litter on his 
desk, he was the image of a crisp, workaday man.2 
11 Ickes noted in his diary the comment by Fenner Brock-
1 way, editor of The New Leader of England, expressing his ap -
11 lickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 159. 
2Ray Tucker, "Ickes - -and No Fooling," Collier's, XCII 
(September 30, 1933), p. 32. 
0 
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proval of the free and open manner in which Ickes held his 
press conferences and the way that he worked in his shirt 
sleeves. There is no doubt, moreover, that Ickes was careful 
of any associations which he knew could destroy an incorrup -
tible public reputation. When Congressman Zioncheck asked 
Ickes to perform his marriage ceremony, Ickes carefully avoided 
the task. "In the back of my mindll, he recounts in his se -
cret diary, tti saw visions of my name appearing in the head-
lines of the papers, because Zioncheck has been getting in 
bad with the newspapers generally on account of his irrational 
conduct. 111 
Addressing the Common Man and 
Being Forthright 
Ickes believed in the importance of communicating with 
the llcommon manll. He felt that the most effectiv e way of 
reaching him was by being forthright and frank. By the same 
token, he advocated intimate contact with the people. When 
touring the Shenandoah Park Civilian Conservation Corps camps 
in 1933 with the President~ he expressed his approval of the 
President using an open car. He said that it gave the people 
1
1 
II 
more intimate contact with Roosevelt than if he drove in a 
closed car. 2 
When the Nazi threat became a matter of concern to the 
Administration in 1939, Ickes expressed the opinion that if 
lickes, Secret Diary. Vol . I, p. 567. 
2Ibid . , p. 78. 
-- ·--- ·-- ·- --
0 
I. 
i 
I 
the President wanted to strengthen public sentiment in the 
country he should have some cabinet members go out and 11 face 
the people 11 and talk to them about the issues involved. 1 
14 
In the Presidential campaign against Wendell Willkie, 
I ckes repeatedly told the President that the Administration 
should : 11 tell to the people the whole truth about the inter-
national situation. 112 
In that same campaign Ickes expressed his dissatis -
faction over the 11 i nspection 11 trips that the President was 
making . He felt that they were political in essence and that 
the p eop l e would not l ike something deceptive. He also ex -
pressed being in favor of the President coming right out 
frankl y and making campaign speeches.3 
When speaking before many of the nation ' s l eading bus -
iness and finance men at the Economi cs Club of New York on 
February 14, 1940, the p lain- spoken Ickes launched into a 
speech in which he denounced many business practices as un -
fa ir, undemocratic and hypocritical . He said that the 
phrases: "free enterprise 11 , 11 government interference with bus -
iness" 
' 
and ''the need of confidence 11 were "glittering gen-
1 I ckes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, p. 721. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. III, p. 233. 
3 I bid . , p. 351. 
II 
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eralizations 11 which 11 muddy up 11 thinking when clear thinking 
was called for. 1 
Again Ickes displayed his forthrightness when he de-
cided to discuss the "Supreme Court packing" issue before the 
Texas Legislature, who, a week before had gone on record as 
being against the President 1 s proposal. In his diary Ickes 
tells of the 11 gasp 11 that went up in the legislature when he 
expressed his intention to discuss the issue and how, never-
theless, he 11 waded right into the constitutional issue with 
both feet. 112 
Possibly Ickes 1 belief in forthrightness is best ex-
pressed in his words concerning people who try to get into the 
favor of the press: 
Let me say, first of all, that I have no patience with 
those men and women in public life who abashingly try to 
curry favor with the newspapers, either because they are 
too cowardly to fight or because of a desire to build up 
reputations as benign, clever, and humane statesmen. I 
maintain that it is far more self-respecting to be a cur-
mudgeon--and a mean one--than a newspaperman 1 s doormat. 
Only a certain type of moronic journalist will have any 
admiration for the public official who crawls around on 
his belly before glorified printers 1 devils.3 
Fighting and Taking the Offensive 
An outstanding characteristic of Ickes 1 philosophy of 
persuasion was his belief in attacking opponents so as to 
1940, 
York: 
....L 
1u.s., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 
LXXXVI, Part 13, pp. 82'7, 828. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, p. 80. 
3Harold L. Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New 
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943), p. 57. 
0 
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place them on the offensive. When advi s ing the President on 
his message to Congress in 1935 , Ickes stressed the need for a 
"fighting " message. 1 
At the time when Al Smith was attacking the adminis-
tration in 1936, he again expressed his belief in attacking 
all along the line. Writing in his secret diary about a 
speech Smith was to give, Ickes said: "I think instead of 
allowing Smith to start the offensive by his speech here next 
Saturday, he should have been put on the defensive by a sav -
age attack prior to that date . "2 
When President Roosevelt made a speech in Washington 
on March 4 , 1937, in which he did not refrain from being 
frank, Ickes expressed his approval and hailed it as one of 
the outstanding speeches delivered by an American statesman. 
In h is private diary he excitedly remarked : "It was a fighting 
speech. n3 Again in the 1940 presidential campaign against 
Wendell Willkie, Ickes urged a vigorous campaign directed at 
once against Willkie to prevent the Democrats from being put 
on the defensive. 4 
In 1939, the Dies Committee investigating communistic 
lickes Secret Diary Vol I p 499 , , 
' 
. 
2Ibid . , p. 518 . 
3Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol . II, p. 88. 
4 James A. Farley, Jim Farley ' s Story: The Roosevelt 
Years, (New York: McGraw - Hill Book Company , 1948 ) , p. 244. 
I 
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activities started to call witnesses on the stand who de -
nounced Ickes and other members of the Interior Department . 
Ickes saw the need for a quick reply and attack. He wrote in 
his diary t hat Congressman Dies : 11 will try to smear me if he 
can, but I do not propose to let him get a way with it without 
knowing t hat he had been in a fight.rrl At a press conference 
Ickes said that Dies was the outstanding "zany rr of all politi -
cal history and then he went on to give him (as Ickes put it) 
11 
11 hellrr by saying that no police court judge anywhere in the 
country would conduct such hearings as Dies was conducting. 
Ickes continued saying that Dies ' evident intention was to 
smear the New Deal and that anyone who had anything he wanted 
to get out of his system against any New Dealer had a ready 
welcome at the hands of the Dies Committee. At another press 
conference Ickes gave out another statement accusing Dies 
of allowing his committee to be used as a sounding board for 
a 11 foreign dictatorship" and accusing him of a lack of pa-
t . t. 2 rlo lSm . 
Fighting Men, Not Principles 
Just as he attacked Congressman Dies rather than the 
principle behind an investigating committee of that nature, 
1 Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. III, p. 33. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol . II, p. 507. 
II 
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Ickes used his energie s primarily in fighting men, rather than 
systems or principles. He be lieved that it was men who de -
vised the principles and called them sacrosanct in order to 
delude those who were uninformed . In this way he resembled 
the muckrakers, the reformers of an earlier period, with whom 
Ickes had associated during his Chicago reform battles. Per -
sonal controversy was not frightening to him and he criticized 
others ' desire to avoid, as he put it: 11 a rough- and-tumble 
fight. 111 
Ickes always managed to find a personal villain with 
whom he associated with an issue. It was as if he believed in 
demonology and was determined to demolish speci f ic demons. 
When Charles Lindbergh was supporting the Hit l er re -
gime, Ickes expressed hearty approval of a smashing attack 
against Lindbergh that Dorothy Thompson made following a Lind-
bergh speech over the radio . Ickes expressed the opinion that 
it was good that the attack was made even though there was 
some question as to the tact of the comments made by Miss 
2 Thompson . 
I n Rooseveltts famous "Court Battle " , Ickes set his 
sights on Chief Justice Hughes and prepared a speech to be 
given before the Charitable Irish Society of Boston in which 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol . III , p . 378. 
2Ibid., p. 20. 
0 
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he referred to Hughe s as accepting retainers from the biggest 
corporations in the country to plead their causes before re -
II turning to the Supreme Court as Chief Just ice. The President 
II 
II 
discouraged Ickes from making this reference, however, be -
cause he felt that it was not wise to come that close to a 
personal reference to a member of the court. 1 
When Hugh Johnson critic ized Ickes, the latter paid 
his respects to the General in no uncertain te rms, implying 
that he ought to have a decoration from Hitler and ending up 
with the charge that Johnson had never gotten over h is dis -
appointment because t he President had not made him Public 
Works Administrator and Oil Administrat or instead of I ckes . 2 
On July, 1938, Commander Charles E. Ro sendahl, a naval 
expert on helium, gave out an interview in which he criti -
cized Ickes ' refusal to approve a propo se d shipment to Ger -
many of that gas. When he was questioned about this at his 
press conference, Ickes hit back at Rosendahl by remarking 
that after being 11 wined and dined 11 in Germany, Rosendahl had 
come bac k to America to criticize the Government for not ship-
ping he lium to Germany , although this would have constituted 
a violation of a law of Congress . 3 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol . II, p. 87. 
2Ibid . , p. 577 . 
3Ibid. , p. 427. 
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Humor and Descriptive Phrasing 
Harold Ickes believed in the persuasional value of hu-
mor and descriptive phrasings. nickesisms'' became favorite 
copy of the press and along with his reputation for vitriolic 
attack, sarcasm and sharp invective, this fostered a wide 
hearing for whatever he had to say. 1 It seems that he real-
ized the value of capitalizing on this reputation by selecting 
provocative titles for his speeches and articles to insure 
wide interest in them. Titles such as: "Nations in Night-
shirtsn, nNot Guiltyrr and "Landon's Angelsn denote this ten-
dency. 
Ickest use of humor was meaningful and devastating. 
When the chairman of a Congressional Committee investigating 
petroleum industry control thanked Ickes for his frank answers, 
Ickes replied: "Well, I acquired the habit early. I have not 
been able to get over it to a sufficient degree to be a good 
politician." 2 
Ickes' attacks on Thomas Dewey, a presidential candi-
date during 1940, vividly illustrated Ickes ' humor and des-
11 criptive phrasing. When asked at a press conference whether 
he had listened to a speech made by Dewey, Ickes replied: nNo, 
lNobles, op. cit., p. 69. 
I 
,I 
2u.s., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and 11 
Foreign Commerce, Hearing, Petroleum Investigation, 76th Cong., , 
lst Sess., 1939, H.R. 290, H.R. 7372, p. 543. 
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I did not listen because I have a baby of my own.nl At that 
same press conference he remarked that Dewey 's efforts to gain 
the Republican nomination for the Presidency reminded him of a 
commencement oration by a bright pupil which drew the comment 
from admiring friends that he did very we ll considering his 
age. 2 
Before this time when Dewey had announced his candi-
dacy, Ickes had commented that the New York governor had 
11 thrown his diaper into the ring. 11 3 Dewey immediately issued 
a statement to the effect that if he were elected, he would 
fire Ickes. Ickes was delighted to subsequently send Dewey a 
II ''letter of resignation" to become effective if, as he said it, 
the 11 incredible 11 happened. 4 
II When, at a debate before the American Society of News-
paper Editors, a correspondent from The Oklahoma City Times 
tried to ridicule Ickes for writing in a Look magazine arti -
cle that a diaper had one pin in front and one behind (an 
incorrect direction), Ickes ' retort was that he was willing 
to meet the correspondent in any nursery at any time to prove 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol. III, p . 81. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 95. 
4Mont Judd Harmon, 11 Harold L. Ickes: A Case Study In 
New Deal Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1953), p. 42. 
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which knew mo r e about putting on a diaper and concluded that 
he had written as he had in Look magazine about the method of 
putting on diapers because he wanted some 11 sucker editors" to 
11 "fa l l n for it and give him some additional publicity . To 
II 
this incident Ickes commented in his diary that it brought the 
house down and that the chairman of the meeting turned to him 
and laughingly said: 11 You win!nl 
I ckes delighted in using his ability at wit and humor 
to both demol ish his opponents and gain the favor of his au -
diences. His humoristic references were incisive. Remarking 
that Dewey had nthrown his diaper into the ring " struck 
cogently at Dewey's youthfulness which was one of that candi -
date ' s main weak spots in the quest for the presidential 
office . I ckes ' abi l ity at descriptive phrasing was not lim-
ited to its ' use in his own speeches, moreover. He often 
suggested phrases to the President which he might use. For 
example, the idea of using " quarantine " as the word to key -
note Roosevelt ' s speech concerning Italy, Germany and Japan 
in the international situation in 1937 came from I ckes . 
I ckes ' philosophy was that descriptive phrasing and humor were 
valuable tools which could be use d to persuade. 
II 
I 
'I 
.I 
I 
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------------------------------------------------------------ 1' 
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I I I, pp. 164- 166. 
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Emotional Impact 
It would be incorrect to imply that all of Ickes' per-
suasion was carefully planned by him to achieve a particular 
effect . As evidenced by reports of his contemporaries and 
by the notations in his diaryy Ickes was a person who easily 
became emotionally aroused. There is no doubt that much of 
what he said and wrote was done when he was in a state of high 
emotion. As a result, we find that many of his speeches and 
writings were highly prejudiced, unreasonable and savage. 
Rhetorically speaking, Ickes' speeches and writings were weak 
if judged in terms of logical demonstration. His strongest 
appeals were directed to the emotions of his audience. 1 
Although I ckes ' personality tended toward the emotion-
al side, this does not account for all of the emotiona l con -
tent in his persuasion. He did realize the value of emot i on-
al content and he conciously included it in his writings and 
speeches . When reading a rough draft of a speech the Presi-
dent was to give, for instance, he suggested that the speech 
be improved by making parts of it more "strong and forceful. rr2 
In 1940, when Maury Maverick, the Mayor of San ~ntonio 
came to Washington looking for a position in the War Depart-
ment, Ickes made the observation that Maverick was too 11 vola-
lNobles, op. cit., p. 84 . 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. III, p. 357. 
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tile" to be entrusted with an important administrative job but 
that he would be just the man to send out on propaganda work 
to inform the youth of America about the significance of the 
war then going on. 1 He seemed to feel that being "volatilell 
would help achieve effective propaganda. 
Ickes also judged the success of his persuasion by 
examining the intensity of agreement or disagreement that it 
resulted in. When he was attacking Wendell Willkie during l94q 
he noted that there was no 11middle ground 11 in the reactions to 
a particular speech that he had made but th_at they were ex-
treme in both approval or disapproval. He wrote in his diary: 
JTThe critics have been so extreme in their expressions and so 
bitter in their anger that I continue to be persuaded that 
this was the most effective political speech I have ever made .11 2 
Ickes believed that in order to gain and maintain interest 
from his audiences, an emotional approach was beneficial. 
Conclusion 
As we shall see, Harold Ickes used particular propa-
ganda techniques and had a particular philosophy by which he 
felt he could persuade the American public. Ultimately, how-
ever, it must be remembered that there were two parts at the 
core of his philosophy concerning persuasion. First, except 
libid.' p. 205. 
2Ibid. , p. 312. I •' 
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in a few isolated instances, he did not use his ability to 
sway public opinion for causes which he did not sincerely 
believe were best for the majority of the people. Secondly he 
had an unswaying faith that if freedom of the press and free-
dom of speech were existent, the most satisfactory results 
would accrue. 
Writing about the freedom of the press and freedom of 
speech in his diary, he referred to them as 11political funda-
mentals11.1 In his bo ok Freedom of the Press Today (a coll-
ection of articles on freedom of the press by noted newspaper -
men which Ickes assembled and had published), Ickes said: 11 I 
am convinced that our democracy needs, more than ever before, 
a truly free press that represents no class or economic 
group . 112 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 350. 
2Harold L. Ickes (comp. ), Freedom of the Press Today 
(New York: The Vanguard Press, 1941), p. 4. 
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CHAPTER III 
HAROLD L. ICKES - THE MAN 
The Early Years 
Harold L. Ickes was born on his grandfather 1 s farm 
near Hol l idaysburg, Blair County, Pennsy lvania, on March 15, 
1876, to Jesse B. W. and Martha Ann (McEwen) McCune Ickes. He 
was the second of seven children. Eight or ten generations 
before, his fatherls ancestors had settled in Montgomery Coun-
ty , Pennsylvania, intermarry ing with Swedish, Finnish and 
French stock and taking part in the Revolutionary War. His 
motherJs ancestory sprang f rom a line of Scots who settled on 
the eastern slopes of the Allegheny Mountains of Pennsylvania 
in pre - Revolutionary times. His Grandfather McCune was a mem-
ber of the State Legislature, and his father was, for twenty-
seven years, a member of the County Court in Huntington Coun -
ty, Pennsylvania . 
His fat her was raised a Baptist; his mother a Presbyter-
ian , while his early ancestors were 11 strict German Lutherans 11 • 1 
He was brought up in a strict Presbyterian faith. - In his 
autobiography he relates: 11 I was taught to be lieve that Pres-
byterianism was the quickest and t he only sure way to grace. 11 2 
lHarold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon 
(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943), p. 7. 
2Ibid., p . 8 . 
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Jesse I ckes, Harold 1 s father, seems to have been more 
interested i n joining variou s organizations than in concen-
trating on the business of ra i sing a family . Besides being on 
the town baseball team he was on t h e volunteer f i re depart-
t d t d . t • l men an numerous secre - or er socle les. When Harold was a 
child the e l der Ickes had been set up in business as the pro -
prietor of a notions store b u t i t folded becau se he (as h is 
son Harold puts it) nhad 1notions 1 of his own that ran to play 
more than to work." 2 Ickes remembered his father as being 
II " seldom, if ever, home of an evening. So far as h is family 
II 
was concerned he was a pleasant, though scarcely more than a 
casual, acqua i ntance. 11 3 
Harold Ickes 1 first contact with p olit i cs came before 
he was sixteen years old. His father ran for the select council 
and young I ckes d i str i buted his campaign cards. They lost the 
election against the Democratic candidate (the Ickes family 
w as R epu bli a ) c n an l lS d • t . ln es lng · ter t• t o no t e, as a pre l d u e 
to I ckes 1 later political combats against " b ig business", 
that one of the contribut i ng factors to his fat her 1 s defeat 
was "the influence of the Pennsylvania Railroad over the poli -
tics, as well as over t h e business life, of the City of Al -
l I b id. 
--
2Ibid. 
--
3rbid. 
--
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toona. The !railroad set' didn't seem to care much for Jesse 
l Ickes. 1! 
As a sidelight to the early political interests of Ha~ 
old Ickes, we can refer to the incident told by his wife, Jane 
Ickes, in her preface to The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes. 
Mrs. Ickes tells of the time when at the age of nine, Harold 
interrupted a heated controversy over the merits of Blaine vs 
Cleveland with the remark: Hrcleveland is not good anyhow; he 
can take off his collar without unbuttoning it. rH 2 
The Move to Chicago 
After the death of his mother in 1890, Ickes moved to 
C~icago where he went to work in a drug- store operated by an 
uncle at near - by Englewood. At this time he was sixteen years 
of age. Chicago was then the city of horsecars and cable cars . 
The Auditorium with its huge audience hall, (in which Ickes 
was destined to fight many political battles) had just been 
completed. The rich citizens to the city drove behind high- II 
stepping horses drawing ornate carriages from which tall-hatted 
coachmen and footmen looked down from their posts with what, 
in retrospect, seemed to the impecunious young Ickes a Tldevas -
tating scorn 11 .3 
1 Ibid. , p . l 0 . 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. vi. 
3Ickes, Autobiography, op. cit . , p. 11 . 
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While working at his uncle's drugstore he attended 
Englewood High School where he became editor of a weekly maga-
zine and president of the s enior class. Even though he was a 
victim of the typhoid fever epidemic in Chicago in 1893, Ickes 
managed to recover and make his lessons up so a s to graduate 
with his class, ranking in the first ten of seventy -two stu-
dents. 
With the encouragement of one of his high school teach-
ers , Agnes Rogers, Harold decided to attend the newly formed II 
University of Chicago. When he reque s ted money from h is father 
to attend the university Jesse Ickes 11 turned a stony ear to 11 
any and all appeals for help. nl The elder Ickes, however, wa s 
willing to introduce t h e young Ickes to President Harper of 
the University of Chicago and explain the situation with the 
hope of aid in terms of remunerative work and a loan. 
Throughout his college years Ickes worked at his 
uncle's drugstore, taugh t night school and did odd jobs at the 
university to pay his way. After seven years of labor, sweat 
and 11 occasional tears 112 he was able to acquire his Bachelor 
of Arts degree. He was graduated cum laude but his clothes 
were so shabby that he was ashamed to go up to the platform to 
receive his diploma.3 
• 
1 Ibid., p. 19. 
2Ibid. , p. 21 . 
3The New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18. 
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As a Reporter 
Ickes' first job after graduating from college was as 
a reporter for the Ch icago Record and then the Chicago Tribune 
(before it came under the control of Col. Robert R. McCormick, 
with whom Ickes conducted a long and violent feud in later 
years). As Assistant Political Editor for the Chicago Record 
he had his first opportunity to give vent to a talent at in-
vective (more of which will be discussed later). It was in 
this position that Ickes probably got the first opportunity to 
view the inner workings of political machines. 
He also learned to appreciate the importance of the 
press in relation to political influence. This knowledge of 
the importance of the press later led him, during his career 
as Secretary of the Interior, to carry on a continuing feud 
with certain factions of t h e newspaper world who tried to 
smear him and the Roosevelt administration . His battles with 
William Randolph Hearst and Col. Robert R. McCormick were ex-
amples of this feud. 
The corruption of the Chicago pol i ticians s h ocked the 
young man who had been reared under strict Calvinistic prin-
1 
ciples by his mother and aunt. Ickes, later writing about 
his early experiences in life, said: 
I became cynically wise to t he selfishne s s and meannes s 
of men when their appetites are involved .... I found 
lickes, Autobiography, op. cit ., pp. 33, 34. 
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out too that there are men and women who often serve 
the' commbn good at great self- sacrifice and without any 
hope of or desire for political reward or even without 
any, except condemnqtory, public recognition of them-
selves.1 
Emergence of the Reformer 
During thi s same period I ckes came to know the leaders 
of the so - called reform element in Chicago, of which John May-
nard Harlan was leader. These men were fighting a political 
machine that was deeply imbued with corruption and graft. It 
was the age when the Chicago City Council voted juicy fran -
chises to Charles T. Yerkes, an ex - convict from Philadelphia, 
to operate the street - car l ines. The value of these fran -
chises increased many- fold and they were capitalized on the 
stockmarket for mi llions more than they were worth. 
Mr. Yerkes 1 relations with the City Council were very com-
fortab l e. When he needed the rights to a street, or a 
couple of tunnels under the river, he pre s sed a button. II 
His commissioner of aldermanic relations came running. 
Soon there floated through the dark corridors of t he City 
Hall word of something good on the griddle. There would 
then be a meeting of two or t hree go- betweens in a hotel 
or a saloon back- parlor. In due time twenty or thirty 
aldermen would bJ~ s som out wi th new race-horses or deeds 
to nice property. 
The Yerkes machinations were but one of the many cor -
rupt franch i se arrangements made in Chicago at that time to 
1Ibid. 
2Lloyd Lewis and Henry J. Smith, Chicago, The History 
of Its Reputation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company , 1929), 
p. 242. 
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which Icke s was exposed. There were others that took advan-
tage of the nsystem 11 • Since the city owned all the streets 
and alleys, it could sell them at will. Gas-companies seeking 
to lay pipelines and railroads needing sw itch-tracks, nshopped 11 
for them in the City Hall. Although the aldermen received 
salaries that were nominal, it was estimated that they each 
earned approximately $20,000 in graft every year . 1 
Ordinances were passed through the bribed legislature 
for franchises which did not actually exist or were not ex-
pected to function. The 11 rightsn to these non- existant com-
panies were then sold by the aldermen who had formed them. 2 
From his vantage point as a reporter, Ickes began to under-
stand t he psychology of the professional politician.3 
By this time he had broken from his Republican heri-
tage and moved into independent politics by voting for Repub -
~ lican President McKinley and Democratic Governor Altgeld. 
By 1897, he was managing the mayoralty campaign of indepen-
dent Republican John M. Harlan, the enemy of the Yerkes Machina 
This political contest was a crucial one in Chicagots history 
s ince it was fought upon the traction issue, one of the chief 
sources of graft in Chicago at that time. Ickes was to fight 
corruption in government many times over later in his career. 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., pp. 242, 243. 
3Ickes, Autobiography, op . cit . , pp. 33, 34. 
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This time he lost. The vote which he polled, however, helped 
to influence the successful candidate, Cart~r H. Harrison, 
to take up the struggle against Yerkes and finally force him 
out of Chicago. 
Between his intermittant political battles to help 
Harlan, Ickes managed to attend the Law School at the Univer-
sity of Chicago and receive his law degree in 1907. During 
this period Ickes was also a shrill and persistent denouncer 
II of Samuel Insull, the Chicago utilities magnate, and William 
Hale (Big Bill) Thompson, the Chicago mayor who won a campaign 
on the platform of promising to "punch King George V. of Eng-
land in the snoot. rr 1 
II As the franchises in the street - car lines expired, 
II 
Ickes took an active role in the battle to conserve the publicts 
II 
0 
interest in them, but the battle was to no avail. In 1907, 
the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Lobdell v. City of 
Chicago, ruined the municipal ownership program by holding 
that the certificates to be issued in purchasing the traction 
certificates. 2 
When Harlan disappeared from the political scene, 
Ickes was drawn to the work that Charles E. Merriam, a college 
professor, was doing in the city council. They soon became 
1The New York Times, February 4, 1952, p . 18. 
2Albert Lepawsky, Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935}, p . 76. 
~ ~----------~--------
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personal and political friends. In 1911, the same year that 
I ckes married Anna Wilmarth Thompson, a woman of considerable 
wealth who shared his interest in politics (she was a member 
of the Illinois State Assembly}, he backed Merriam for the 
mayoralty but lost again t o Carter Harrison who seemed to 
have exhausted all of his vital energies in his fight with 
Yerkes and who had given up combatting the growing forces of 
l 
civic dissolution. 
Ickes role in Chicago reform politics is vivdly por -
trayed in h is book The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon. Along 
with books like Brand Whitlock ' s Forty Years of It and Lincoln 
Steffens ' Autobiography, this account is one of the classic 
documents of the progressive era . 
As a Progressive 
Los i ng faith in the hope that either the Republicans 
or Democrats would ever clean up corruption in Illinois , 
II 
Ickes jo i ned the Progress i ve movement. After the Merriam may- I 
oralty campaign, both Ickes and Merriam became leaders of Re - 1
1 
publican progressivism in Chicago . Early in 1912, they played 
prominent parts in the fight between Theodore Roosevelt and 
Taft for the Republican nomination for president and the sub -
sequent formation of the Progres sive Party. Actually the 11 Bull 
lpaul H. Douglas, 11 I ckes of Chicago," The New Republic, 
LXXIV (May 3, 1933}, p. 332. 
II 
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Moose" Party was born in Chicago at midnight on June 23, 1912, 
when Roosevelt ' s supporters, refusing to take Taft, marched 
out to hold a rump convention down the street. Ickes was a 
member of this group . Eventually he became chairman of the Pro-
gressive Committee of Cook County . 
Although his main interest lay in reform politics, 
Ickes entered into a law partnership in 1913 with another Pro-
gressive, Donald Richberg, and Richberg 1 s father. Richberg, 
i n his book My Hero, recollects that at time Ickes was a man 
of somewhat 11 uneven temper", an intense partisan of any cause 
which he advocated, and "definitely a reformer". 1 The strong 
interest in politics that Ickes possesed at that period is 
illustrated in Richberg 1 s statement in that same book: "Ickes 
was engaged in many political activities of a reform nature, 
in the course of which he drew heavily from time to time on my 
voluntary services." 2 
Although Ickes' rupport of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 
ended in failure with the victory of Woodrow Wilson, Hughes 
considered the 11 Bull Moosers" enough of a force to appoint 
Ickes and five other Progressives to sit on his campaign com-
mittee in 1916. 
As the Progressive movement began to decline, Charles 
lnonald R. Richberg, My Hero (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1954), p. 61. 
2Ibid., pp. 61, 62. 
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Merriam, then an alderman in Chicago, was influential in get -
ting Donald Richberg appointed as the attorney for the city 
in the famous ngas casen involving the Peoples Gas Company, 
whose head was Samuel Insull. The committee of aldermen were 
named by the then Mayor William Hale Thompson to carry out 
his campaign pledge to fight the gas consumers 1 battle . 
Since Insull had contributed about $100,000 to the campaign 
to elect the mayor and had invested additional amounts in po -
litical handouts, Richberg 1s chance of winning the case were 
not good . He subsequently did lose the fight. 1 
Even t hough many of the early reformers were going 
over to the ranks of Insull because of threats and bribes, 
Ickes fought on. In 1923 he backed William E. Dever, a Dem-
ocrat, for the mayoralty with his organization of Independent 
Republicans. With Dever 1s election , Ickes tried to get a 
fair sett l ement of the traction quest i on as the franchi ses were 
expiring, but failed. 
With the re - election of Thompson in 1927, Insull again 
started on his program to consolidate the surface line of Chi -
cago1s transportation network with his own elevated proper-
ties, with the intention of running the combined lines under 
his management. (It was later revealed that his purpose for 
doing this were to drain the profits of the surface lines into 
libid., p . 72. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I 
0 
37 
his l osing elevated properties.) 
Bills were passed through a bribed legislature permit-
ting the city to grant what was really a perpetual franchise 
and fixing the valuation of the combined lines at least 
$72,000,000 more than that which any reputable appraisal would 
have been. 1 Ickes was one of the few men at that time to 
fight Insull, t hen at the height of his power . Again, as the 
leader of the Peoplets Traction League, he went down in defeat. 
Shortly after the beginning of President Wilson 1 s 
second term of office, the United States went to war with Ger - ' 
many. Ickes, who had 11 long felt that Germany was menacing the 
world 11 2 wanted to go abroad into active service . He was re-
fuse d , however, because he was deaf in one ear. Instead, he 
served with the Illinois State Council of Defense, a national 
Committee of Public Information and then with the YMCA . This 
position with the YMCA gave him the opportunity to partici -
pate in war activities in France. 
When he returned to America in 1919 he resumed his 
private law practice and political activities. About the same 
time t hat he backed William E. Dever for the mayoralty of Chi-
cago, he took part in the movement to nominate Hiram W. John- 11 
son, the progressive Republican from California, for President. 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. vii. 
2Ickes, Autobiography, op. cit., p. 230. 
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Of that convention Ickes wrote: 
The miserable machinations that went on in that Chicago 
convention were stomach- turning . They make me feel as if 
I had a mouth full of alum. They gripe me still when I 
think of them.l 
In his eyes Harding was the nominee of selfish men who "were 
thinking little of their country but much of postmasterships, 
district-attorneyships and marshalships. " 2 Again he was 
fighting the forces of corruption and graft. When a voice 
was called for, Ickes was one of the few who shouted "No" at 
the top of their lungs.3 
Supporting Roosevelt 
With this defeat, Ickes, instead of remaining in the 
Republican ranks as did most of his Progressive friends, sur-
veyed the Democratic possibilities. Thinking of the many 
"Bull Moosers" to whom the Roosevelt name meant a lot, he 
backed Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Vice Presidential nom-
ination, with Cox of Ohio heading the ticket. It might be 
added here that the popularity of the Roosevelt name among 
other Progressives was probably not the only reason for Ickes 
backing Franklin D. at this time . Ickes had felt a deep love 
1 Ickes, Autobiography, op. cit ., p. 230. 
2 Ibid. , p . 2 3 3 . 
3The New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18 . 
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1 
and respect for Theodore Roosevelt. It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, to hypothesize that Ickes saw the hope of a rein-
carnation of the qualities of the elder Roosevelt in the 
younger man. Although he knew that the Democrats would pro -
bably be engulfed by the 11 back to normalcyn groundswell, he 
nevertheless supported Roosevelt. In 1928, he stayed with 
the Democratic Party and backed Al Smith against Herbert Hoo-
2 ver. 
In 1932, after a history of many losses on the poli -
tical battlefield, Ickest luck changed. 
The advisers of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt 
concluded that he needed someone to help him pick up a 
few Republican progressive votes in the Middle West. 
Arthur Mullen, Democratic National Committeeman from 
Nebraska, knew and admired Mr. Ickes and brought him to 
the attention of Mr. Roosevelt.3 
Ickes organized the Western Independent Republicans 
for Roosevelt and took an active part in the campaign, man-
aging two local campaigns in his spare time. 
Appointment as Secretary 
of the Interior 
After the election Ickes found himself a winner for 
the first time in twenty-five years of politics. It occured 
1Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 283. 
2 Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p . viii. 
3The New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18. 
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to him now that he would like to work in Washington. He first 
thought of the idea of asking for an appointment as Commission-
er of Indian Affairs but as a result of encouragements from 
Senators Johnson and Bronson Cutting, he decided to aspire to 
the post of Secretary of the Interior. Coincidentally, John-
son and Cutting were both offered the job by Roosevelt. Each 
refused and both suggested Ickes as a good prospect. 
On February 21, 1933, at a meeting of Roosevelt 1 s 
administration advisory council in his 65th Street New York 
home, Franklin Delano Roosevelt called Ickes aside and said: 
Mr. Ickes, you and I have been speaking the same language 
for the past twenty years. I am having difficulty find-
ing a Secretary of the Interior. I want a man who can 
stand on his own feet. Above all things, I want a man who 
is honest, and I have about come to the conclysion that 
the man I want is Harold L. Ickes of Chicago. 
When Ickes took h i s position as the Secretary of the 
Interior he was stepping into a department of government that 
was stained with t he Teapot Dome scandals. He was, therefore, 
in a somewhat wary mood when he took over the department. 
Though a conservationist, he knew nothing about the department 
and had no philosophy about how it should be run. On the 
other hand, rrhe knew where he stood on any subject anybody 
might be so incautious as to bring up, possesed a tremendous 
capaci~y for work, a durable reputation, and got just fine 
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. ix. 
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rapport with Roosevelt. 1 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. vividly des-
cribes Ickes at the beginning of his career as Secretary of 
Interior: 
The President who had hardly heard of Ickes in February, 
was viewing him with considerable respect by June . The 
new Secretary, it was evident, was a formidable figure. 
Now just under sixty, he was the scarred and doughty vet-
eran of a thousand battles, and of very nearly a thou-
sand defeats. But no setback had diminished his fighting 
spirit. He had wielded sword and buckler so long against 
evil-first in reform politics in Chicago, then with T.R. 
in the Bull Moose party, then in the guerrilla warfare he 
and his law partner Donald Richberg had waged against 
Samuel Insull and Big Bill Thompson in Chicago-that he had 
become almost the incarnati~n of lonely, righteous and 
inextinguishable pugnacity. 
Ability as an Administrator 
Ickest ability at administration was soon noticed. 
When he first took office he required one bureau at a time to 
route all of its policy decisions and attendant data through 
his own offjce. When he was satisfied that each organization 
was functioning properly, he turned its administration back to 
the bureau chief. This learn- by-doing technique had the double 
I 
I 
'I 
effect of making the Interior bureaus, the most independent 11 
of any in the government at that time, clearly understand that 
Ickes was the chief authority and at the same time of per-
mitting them to run their own affairs so long as they did it 
according to the plan laid out by Ickes.3 
1 11 Triumph of the Empire Builders, n Fortune, February, 
1952, pp. 114, 115. 
2schlesinger, Jr.' op. cit., p. 283. 
3Fortune, February, 1952, op. cit. , pp. 114, 115. I 
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Roosevelt soon realized that with Ickes's guts, his dri-
ving energy, his full-steam- ahead approach, he was the 
best administrator in Washington. Rooseyelt kept drop -
ping bigger and tougher jobs in his lap. 
Safeguarding the Public Interest 
The first big job that Roosevelt gave to Ickes was 
the responsibility of administering t he Public Works Adminis-
tration (one of the main instruments for Roosevelt's pump-
priming policies). It is recorded that Al Smith came to Ickes 
when he was given seven billion dollars to spend on PWA and 
said: !lfif you hold the graft to fifteen percent, you'll be 
about right and you'll make a very good record for honesty. rn 2 
Ickes was to do much better than that, however, by wiping out 
practically all traces of corruption. 
Inevitabl y , t he vastness of the sum (by the standards of 
1933) attracted the hopeful, the enterprising, the fool-
ish, and it is safe to assume, the corrupt. Secretary 
Ickes certainly assumed it. Langdon Post, a zealous New 
Dealer, attributed to Ickes' Chicago experience his "lack 
of faith in human nature, his fear of graft and cor -
ruption.3 
He called himself the "Old Curmudgeon", a type defined 
as "miserly, niggard, churl''. Certainly his outlook was quiz-
zical and his manner harsh with anyone he suspected of placing 
1Ruth Gruber, "Ickes: American Legend," The Nation, 
CLXXIV (April 19, 1952), p. 264 . 
2illarold L. Ickes," Editorial in The New Republic, 
CXXVI (February 11, 1952), p. 4. 
3Denis W. Brogan, The Era of Roosevelt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950), p. 122. 
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private gain before public good. More deeply than anyone, he 
believed honest administration to be a cornerstone of demo-
cracy . 
He hated waste--big or small. He would fight just as 
hard to save a penny's worth of electricity in an office 
in the Interior Department as to save millions of dol-
lars of oil which belonged to the people .. . . he would 
frequently call up his buleau chiefs at 7:45 to see if 
they were at their desks. 
This penurious tendency in Ickes manifested itself 
even before he came to Washington. Donald Richberg tells of 
the time when he, Ickes, and their two law partners finished 
luncheon at the Palmer House in Chicago: 
In customary fashion, we matched to see who would pay the 
bill, and the lot fell to Morgan Davies. Having paid 
it, he left fift y-five cents on the table for the waiter, 
not an extravagant tip even in those days. Ickes said: 
11 That 1 s too big a tip," and, ~ith a gleeful laugh, put 
five cents in his own pocket. 
At one time in World War II Ickes held sixteen jobs, 
each of them probably enough to keep an ordinary man busy 
twenty-four hours a day. He was the boss of all the nation's 
coal mines, Fishery Coordinator for War, Petroleum Adminis-
trator for War, Coordinator of Solid Fuels, as well as, of 
course, Secretary of the Interior. 
He was noted for his honesty. 11 Stouthearted and incor-
ruptible, he was at best a superb public servant .... He was 
1Gruber, op. cit., p. 364 . 
2Richberg, op. cit . , p. 62. 
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an indomitable defender of the national interest. 111 
Accomplishments in the Interior 
Department 
By the end of Ickes' thirteen years as Secretary of 
the Interior, the department had undergone profound changes . 
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The Division of Invest i gations was zealous in ferreting out 
malefactors and 11 Honest Harold11 partially restored public con-
fidence in a department made notorious by the Teapot Dome 
scandal . Interior ' s executives themselves acquired a new con-
fidence stemming as muc h from Ickes' autocratic leadership as 
from the knowledge that he would defend any department de-
cision aga i nst all comers . On the other hand, the develop -
ment of policy was less the result of selection than of what -
ever fortune happened to fall on Interior's doorstep. Though 
hospitable to the ideas of other New Dealers, he made few 
long- range plans not suggested by the events of the moment. 
Ickes looked on the department's business as a flow of cases, 
embodi ed in documents from the bureaus to the Secretary and 
decisions were made in conformance with the precedence set in 
previous cases. 2 
Taking a long view of Ickes' administration of the In -
terior Department it mi ght be said that his influence pro -
1Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., p . 283 . 
2Fortune, February, 1952, op. c i t., p. 115. 
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duced exceptional changes. First of all, the number of em-
ployees increased 160 per cent and the budget increased by 
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347 per cent. 1 Ickes, an exponent of public power, used his 
position as Public Works Administrator to channel millions of 
dollars into the Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclam-
ation. By the time he resigned, t he Department of Interior 
had control of power marketing from all federal power projects 
on the Columbia River and from all future dams to be built by 
the Corps of Engineers. 2 
The department acquired seven new instrumentalities: 
the Office of Territories (1934), The Division of Geography 
(1934), The Bonneville Power Administration (1937), the Office 
of Land Utilization (1940), the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(1940), The Division of Power (1941), the Southwestern Power 
Administration (1943). It also retrieved the Bureau of Mines 
from the Department of Commerce. 
This tremendous growth in the Interior Department was 
a result partly of the abilities of Ickes and also of his am-
bitions. Throughout his administration of the Department of 
Interior, he was constantly involved in power struggles with 
other members of the Administration. His great ambition was 
to transform the Department of Interior into a Department of 
-. 
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Conservation, containing within it all the authority necessary 
for the preservation and development of natural resources . 
The keystone for such a department, as he saw it, had to be 
the Forest Service (in the Department of Agriculture). From 
his first days in Interior, therefore, Ickes rrembarked on an 
interminable campaign of intrigue, persuasion, and pressure 
designed to recapture Forestry from Agriculture. 111 As evi-
denced in his diary, 2 this quest was often childish and rrneu-
roticrr.3 On more than one occasion, when Ickes felt that his 
suggestions were not being followed, he would offer to resign. 
Roosevelt,with a humorous not~ would always refuse to accept 
these resignations. 4 Any setback by the President in this 
quest for power threw him into the state of "a quivering mass, 
sensitive as a girl, suspicious as a moneylender. rr 5 
As a Fighter for Civil Rights 
Not only was Ickes known as an honest and efficient 
administrator but also as a fighter for civil rights. He be-
came one of the strongest spokesmen the American Indians ever 
had and he insisted that negroes have a fair share of the ben-
Fox 
1schlesinger, Jr., op . cit., p. 346. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, pp . 43, 44. 
3James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 374. 
4The New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18. 
5schlesinger, Jr., op . cit., pp. 282, 283. 
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efits and the work load of projects of the Public Works Admin-
istration. He broke segregation in the Department of Interior 
and the public parks. Not only did he appoint Negro advisers 
to his staff, but he permitted Negroes to eat in the Interior 
Department dining room--something that was considered revolu-
tionary in Washington at the time. 1 When Marian Anderson was 
refused permission to sing in Washington's Constitution Hall 
by the Daughters of the American Revolution because of her l! 
race, it was Harold Ickes who made it possible for her to sing 
to 75,000 people assembled at the Lincoln Memorial . 11 
I 
For Harold Icke s , devotion to the principles of liberty, lj 
equality, and human brotherhood constituted a religion in 
itself. Men might be condemned by Ickes for many reasons, 
for stupidity, greed, rapacity, intolerance, smugness; but 
they were never condemned on acc~unt of their race, their 
religious creed, or their color. 
Individualism and Independence 
It seems from all the evidence, Ickes was an indivi-
dualist who said and did what he felt was "right" regardless 
of what other members of the Roosevelt administration or the 
public thought. For instance, after the German dirigible, 
"Hindenburg" exploded at Lakehurst, New Jersey, the Nazi Gov-
ernment sought to obtain 15,500,000 cubic feet of noninflam-
l"The Shape of Things, 11 The Nation, CLXXIV (February 
9, 1952)' p. 117. 
2Mont Judd Harmon, "Harold L. Ickes: A Case Study in 
New Deal Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1953}, p. 440. 
0 
mable helium for use in dirigibles to replace the flammable 
hydrogen gas. Ickes opposed the transfer, even though Pres-
ident Roosevelt and practically every member of the Cabinet 
was in favor of letting Germany have the gas. He would not 
back down from his position because of his fear that Hitler 
might use the helium for military purposes. 1 
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Ickes' bipartisanship was a mark of his independence. 
Because of the various nbattles 11 that he had with members of 
both parties and because of his history of political indepen-
dence, it was difficult for the enemies of the administration '1 
to make accusations of political favoritism. He was des-
cribed as being the 11 gri t :in the oil which keeps party poli-
tics running smoothly. 112 He frustrated and infuriated the 
party politicians. Because of this bipartisanship, however, 
he could be relied upon to defend the Roosevelt Administration 
policies from all comers. He was called the anointed 11 hatchet 
man 11 of the Administration for he could be relied upon to at-
tack any opponent with a vehemence which would insure wounded 
opponents where he swung his ''war club". 3 
The public fame of Ickes rested, to a great extent, on 
the devastating sting of his tongue. His humor and 11 poison-
1Gruber, op. cit., p . 363. 
211 More Trouble for Ickes, 11 The Nation, CXL (February 
6, 1935)' p. 143. 
3Richberg, op. cit . , p . 238. 
II 
arrow 11 wit as well as his joy in battle made his press confer-
ences second only to Roosevelt's. Since he was a classic i st 
and an intellect, his ability to use words and invent new 
ones sent reporters looking for their dictionaries. At one 
press conference, for example, he called Martin Dies a "zany 11 • 
Some of the reporters rushed to their Webster's Dictionary to 
l 
see if he had made the word up. 
One year after President Truman took office as the 
President of the United States, he nominated a wealthy oilman 
from California, Edwin Pauley, to the position of Secretary 
of the Navy. Ickes protested the nomination vigorously be-
cause Pauley, at one time, had offered Icke s a high sum of 
money for Democratic Party funds if he would agree to let some 
of the California offshore oil fields go out of federal jur-
isdiction and into the control of the states and private com-
panies. In this instance Icke s felt so strongly that it was 
not unusual that when Truman did not heed his protestations, 
he resigned from government service. He sent a letter con-
taining a 2,000 word re s ignation and attack to Truman. 2 In 
this attack he tried to cover up what was really a blow to his 
pride. 
On that same day that he resigned, Ickes called a 
lGruber, op. cit., p. 364. 
211 The Old Curmudgeon," Newsweek, XXXIX (February 11, 
1952)' p. 31. 
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press conference to make a statement regarding his retire -
ment . To a group of some four hundred and fifty radio and 
newspaper correspondents he said that the immediate cause of 
his retirement was the Pauley affair. That evening he spoke 
over the radio . In this talk he said that he could no longer 
retain his self-respect and stay in the Cabinet of Truman . 
Because he did not believe that party allegi ance should stand 
in the way of allegiance to the country . He added that he 
did not subscribe to the Nazi view that the interests of party 
and nation are always identical . 1 
Although he claimed to be a crusty, cantankerous and 
vile - tempered curmudgeon, he used this pose to hide a senti -
mentality which he feared would lessen his effectiveness if 
it were displayed publicly. Those who knew him well said that 
in his last years he suffered a "great loneliness" and ''agony 
of sp i rit " not ostensibly evident. 2 
The Latter Years 
After his resignation Ickes devoted much of hi s time 
to writing . He had a newspaper column called 11 an to Man" 
distributed by the New York Post Syndicate and he also wrote 
articlesfor The New Republic . In 1949 he went to New York 
to campaign for Senator Herbert H. Lehman against John Foster 
lThe New York Times, February 14, 1946, p . 1. 
2Gruber , op. cit . , p . 363 . 
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Dulles and again in 1950 against Joe R. Hanley . With char - ~ 
acteristic political independence he made a campaign contri -
bution that same year to help Senator Charles W. Tobey, the 
New Hampshire Republican. 
On Sunday, February 3, 1952, Harold Icke s died at the 
Emergency Hospital in Washington, D.C. as a result of compli -
cations of a former arthritic condition. With his typical 
willingness to break tradition for a cause, he had requested 
simple burial services and in lieu of flower s , contributions 
to be made to the Arthritic and Rheumatism Foundations . The 
New York Times in its obituary noted: 
11 Opposition, even of the most powerful sort , political of 
economic, did not frighten him--it stirred him to swift 
repriral. He was a past master of the not uncertain 
word. 
Conclusions 
If a group of words were sought to describe Harold 
Ickes, heading the list would probably be such descriptions 
as: liberal, progressive, New Dealer, individualist, revolu-
tionary, and reformer. He possesed ideals which included: 
a desire for social reform, a spirit of tolerance toward ra-
c ial and religious differences, an acknowledge of the impor-
tance of the individual but at the same time an acceptance of 
the principle of the interdependency of mankind, a trust in 
lThe New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 16. 
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in reason as a method of arriving at conclusions, belief in 
popular education and a willingness to accept change . These 
aspects of Ickes' thought must be kept in mind as we examine 
the philosophy of persuasion of Harold L. Icke s . 
I 
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CHAPTER rl 
THE PUBLIC WORKS ADMINISTRATION 
By examining Harold Ickes 1 role as the administrator 
of the Public Works Administration we will be able to see him 
functioning in a specific communication area. Placing him in 
the context of a communicator trying to convey certain ideas 
and policies to the American public, those communication tac-
tics which he used will be revealed giving us an insight into 
his persuasion philosophy. 
Background 
On June 16, 1933, four months after the inauguration 
of President Roosevelt, Congress passed his National Indus-
trial Recovery Act. Title II of this act provided for the 
disbursement of three and three-tenths billion dollars (the 
largest appropriation which had ever been made by any govern-
ment during peacetime) on an emergency public works program. 
This provision was one of the measures that the administration 
was taking to 11 prime the pumps 11 of the economy and help pull 
the nation out of the depression by providing employment in 
the construction of public buildings, roads, and other federal 
works. 
Authority to distribute the funds was vested in the 
President. The bill authorized him to undertake construction 
II 
II 
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directly, or to finance construction by loans to states, muni-
cipalities and other public bodies and to certain pr ivate cor-
porations. He was further authorized to make outright grants 
to states and other public bodies. The bill also provided that 
the money should be used to give the maximum amount of employ-
ment at an adequate level of wages. l 
Harold Ickes was named administrator of the Public 
Works Administration (PWA) by the President. By June of 1934, 
a year after the bill was passed, Ickes had alloted the entire 
fund of three and three-tenths billion dollars for 13,266 fed-
eral projects and 2,407 non- Federal projects. The allotments 
included appropriations for roads, The Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, naval construction, the Civilian Conservation Corps 
projects, the Grand Coulee Dam, the Casper-Alcova Dam in 
Wyoming, and subsistence homestead financing . 
Throughout his administration of the Public Works 
funds Ickes was both praised for the car e that he took to pre-
vent waste and graft in the allocation of the money and cri-
ticized for the sluggishness of the opening of the projects 
because of this caution. When the PWA failed to furnish as 
many jobs as anticipated, Harry Hopkins was authorized, in 
1933, to organize the Civil Works Administration independent 
1National Industrial Recovery Act, Public No. 67-73D 
Congress, H.R. 5755, U. S., Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part l, 
pp. 200-210. 
of the work being carried on by Ickes and the PWA. The Civil 
Works Administration was designed to create jobs faster. 
Since many of its projects were trivial, there were widespread 
complaints about "leaf-raking" and other "boon-doggling". 
Therefore, in 1935, both PWA and CWA gave way to a Works Pro-
jects Administration, another independent agency, which lasted 
into World War II. 
Informing the Public 
Ickes' goals as the administrator of PWA were to: (l) 
make sure that there was no waste and corruption in the Ad-
ministration; ( 2) allocate money for the building of ''useful 
public works of social value and lasting benefit" and (3) in-
crease employment through the projects. 1 
One of his first actions as the new Administrator of 
Public Works was to appoint Michael Straus, a Washington cor-
respondent of the Universal News Service, to the position of 
Director of Information for the Public Works Administration. 
From his early newspaper experience in his Chicago corruption 
battles, Ickes knew the value and importance of keeping the 
public informed on all the policies and accomplishments of an 
administration to gain a good reputation. Straus was to be of 
great assistance to Ickes for this purpose. Through press re-
leases and press conferences held by Ickes, the newspapers 
1Harold L. Ickes, "Progress Report of P.W.A. ,"The New 
York Times, August 5, 1933, p. 6. 
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were kept informed on allotments and other information concern-
ing the PWA. Ickes seems to have felt that the press confer-
ences were quite important since in his diary he often made 
remarks showing his concern over them. For example in the 
September 12, 1933 entry he wrote: "My press conferences are 
very well attended now and I get along very well with the cor-
respondents .111 
He was able to gain the reporters 1 friendship by giv-
ing them time and attention for their questions. When a cub 
reporter tried to get him on the telephone during office 
hours, Ickes was willing to give him as much time and attention 
. d 2 as was requlre . This willingness to meet and talk with 
newspapermen coupled with his sharp and candid manner of ans -
wering questions made him popular with the press correspon-
dents. Perhaps the fact that he was once a reporter himself 
made the rapport easier to accomplish. 
It was through conferences with these men and releases 
to the newspapers themselves that Ickes communicated many of 
the policies and accomplishments of the Public Works Adminis-
tration . In the issues of The New York Ti~es for 1934 alone, 
there are forty-eight progress reports of the Public Works Ad-
ministration. An example of these reports appeared in the 
1I ckes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 88. 
2Ray Tucker "Ickes--and No Fooling, 11 Collierls, XCII 
(September 30, 1933), p. 32. 
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June 17, 1934 edition of the nTimes 11 • In an article called: 
11 11 2,886 Million Hours Work Provided by PWA Program 11 , Ickes ex-
tolled on the accomplishments of the PWA in providing em-
II 
ployment for the nationts unemployed. Excerpts from the ar-
ticle illustrate its propaganda value: 
Were it possible to condense the first year 1 s achieve-
ments into a single phrase relating to employment, it 
would be that the PWA program to date has provided rough-
ly, 1,418,000,000--hours of direct employment only to men 
who would otherwise have passed those hours in the ranks 
of the idle .... The record speaks for itself. It 
shows PWA as the wheel-horse in the recovery team Presi-
dent Roosevelt has hitched together.l 
In announcing the allocation of money for the numer-
ous projects of the Public Works Administration throughout the 
country, the press releases often stressed the idea that much 
care went into the scrutiny of each phase of the projects. An 
example of this type of announcement appeared in a story of 
The New York Times concerning an allocation for the completion 
of the Triborough Bridge. Ickes was quoted as saying: 
The application of the Triborough Bridge Authority was 
checked thoroughly by public works engineers and finan-
cial advisors. The administration satisfied itself that 
the project is self-liquidating and economically and so-
cially desirable.2 
It was in releases like this that the Public Works Adminis-
tration was portrayed as a careful and trustworthy purveyor of 
1Harold L. Ickes, 11 2,886 Million Hours Work Provided 
by PWA Program,n The New York Times, June 17, 1934, Section IV, 
p. l. 
2 The New York Times, ~ugust 18, 1933, p. l. 
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the public funds. 
Ickes also fought charges of corruption in his admin-
istration of the PWA by speeches which revealed to the public 
his good intentions to try to prevent graft. For example, in 
February of 1934, in a speech to contractors he charged some 
with "corrupt collusion". He revealed his knowledge of var-
ious devices being resorted to by material manufacturers and 
others to ngouge" the government and expressed his determin-
ation to uncover and convict those engaged in these practices. 1 
In answering charges that PWA "played politics", he 
made a speech over the Columbia Broadcasting System in 1934, 
in which he said: 
PWA has never been in politics .... it was not in poli-
tics during the recent campaign . . . . If PWA had been 
playing politics it would have been particular~y active 
during recent weeks when it was doing nothing. 
Ickes also fostered the good reputation of the Public 
Works Administration through magazine articles. In an article 
in The American Magazine of October, 1933, he stressed the fol-
lowing main points: (l) the vastness of the sum that PWA had 
to expend and difficulties concomitant with this; (2) what 
this money ment to the citizens of the United States in terms 
of food, clothing and shelter through more employment; (3) the 
1Frank R. Kent, Without Gloves, (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1934), p. 1'(8. 
2The New York Times, November 9, 1934, p. 10. 
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deluge of "politicians" that had invaded the administration 
for favoritism in the allocation of the funds and the safe-
guards that had been applied to prevent a "pork barrel" sys-
tem; (4) the excellent staff and esprit de corps of the PWA 
administration in spite of low salaries and long hours; (5) 
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the economy that was being accomplished in the administration 
because of efficient organization and low salaries . 1 
In an article featured by The New Republic, he des-
cribed the recent progress of the Housing Division of the PWA 
and answered the complaints of delays in allotments by the 
attack: 
Others, seeing in the housing movement merely an oppor-
tunity for profit for themselves, are as impatient as the 
theorists at even reasonable delays. They want their 
profits and they want them quickly- - this is the extent of 
their interest .... Our care in keeping down our land 
costs has called for more sneers from those who clear 
slums between courses at conference luncheons than any 
part of our program.2 
In another article in that same periodical four years 
later, in which Ickes defended the PWA, he wrote: "The bitter-
ness and unfairness of some critics are matched only by their 
ignorance. n3 
1Harold L. Ickes, "Spending Three Billions of Your 
Money!, 11 The American Magazine, CXVI (October, 1933}, pp. 18-
19, 92-94 . 
2Harold L. Ickes, "The Federal Housing Program 11 The 
New Republic, LXXXI (December 19, 1934), p. 155. ' 
3Harold L. Ickes, 11 In Defense of the PWA, 11 The New Re 
public, XCIV (March 30, 1938), p . 213. 
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Another example of persuasion through magazine arti-
cles occurred on the second anniversary of the PWA. Writing 
in the Review of Reviews, Ickes compared the Public Works Ad-
ministration to a perfect government organization and pri-
vate business. He said: 
Nevertheless, as I will attempt to demonstrate, PWA comes 
out well by either method of comparison. It is as ef-
ficient as private business and its results do come as 
close to perfection as is humanly possible. 1 
Again he told about the small salarie s of PWA administrative 
employees, the political pressures and the care taken so as 
not to turn PWA into a ''pork barrel''. 
Having reviewed some of the ideas that Ickes tried to 
convey to the public in stating general policies and accom-
plishments, we will now examine various cases and incidents 
where Icke s' tactics and actions to propagate these ideas (and 
therefore enhance the reputation of the Public Works Admini s -
tration) are revealed. 
Portraying the Efficiency and Hone sty 
of the Administration 
Icke s was very sensitive to criticism pertaining to 
lax and corrupt officials within the Public Works Admini s -
tration. He recognized the value of obtaining wide - spread be-
lief that his appointments were non- partisan. Commenting on 
1Harold L. Icke s, "Pork Barrel or P.W. A.?," Review 
of Reviews, XCI (June, 1935), p. 17 . 
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a remark made by Senator 0 1Mahoney in regard to this mould-
ing of public opinion, Ickes wrote in his private diary: 
He told his collegues that I was the cleverest man in the 
Government because I had built up a public opinion to the 
effect that I paid no attention at all to politics in 
making appointments, whereas I paid a good deal of at-
tention and went as far as anyone in making such appoint-
ments. As a matter of fact, this is true. I have never 
objected to political appointments and I make them right 
along, but I do insist on fitness and ability.l 
Probably one of the most effective means by which 
Ickes was able to avoid much criticism on corruption was 
through the operations of the investigation bureau which he 
maintained under the direction of Louis Glavis. Glavis was 
one of the officials who exposed the Ballinger scandals of the 
Department of Interior in 1910 and 1911 and his investigations 
resulted in public discharges of PWA officials. Fo~ example, 
on December 1934, George H. Parker, a chief accountant of the 
PWA and his assistant J. E. Fox, as a result of an inquiry 
by Glavis and his associates, were dismissed. The New York 
Times 1 article concerning this incident quoted Ickes as say-
ing that the action was taken 11 for the good of the service. 112 
Announcements such as these certainly showed the public that 
graft and corruption would not be tolerated in the PWA. 
Ickes was also not sparing in his public criticism of 
fWA employees who loafed, and he was known for the way that he 
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 380. 
2The New York Times, December 21, 1934, p. 27. 
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worked in his shirt sleeves. He seemed to be aware of the 
fact that the New Dealers were often charged with being "soft 
headed dreamers" and his brusque manner and emphasis upon 
"business'' methods were designed to offset that charge as it 
may have been applied to him. 1 
The Ely Incident 
On Wednesday, August 2, 1933, Governor Ely of Massa-
chusetts called Ickes on the telephone and said that there was 
an administrative body in his state which had control over 
municipal finances and he wanted Ickes to say that no public 
works would be assigned to any municipality in Masschusetts 
without first being submitted to that board and getting its 
approval. Ickes told him that the policy was to consider 
'I I 
every proposition on its merits and that if the Cabinet Ad- II 
visory Board of the PWA adopted such a policy with respect to 
Masschusetts it would embarras them in other states. Ely 1 
then told Ickes that if he insisted in his opposition to giv- 1 
ing the states veto power over the municipalities, he (Ely} 
would take the matter to the public by making an open position 
against the Federal Government. To this Ickes replied: 11 Go 
ahead." 2 Ely subsequently released a statement to the press .I I 
1Mont Judd Harmon, "Harold L. Ickes: A Case Study In 
New Deal Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1953), p. 219. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 73. 
to the effect that the refusal of the Cabinet Advisory Board 
of the Public Works Administration to distribute relief funds 
through state agencies was an naffrontn to the Commonwealth 
l 
of Massachusetts . Ickes repl~ed to this charge in a letter 
to Ely (released to the press) saying that the Board had no 
intention of putting funds into the hands of any agency where 
npoli tical influence rr could be used. He said that it would 
be nterrible political powern to let Governors say what cities 
2 
could have money. 
The sharpness and dispatch that Ickes handled the 
charges of Governor Ely was characteristic of the way that he 
dealt with such matters. He was quick to make public replies 
derogating the opponent (in this case the innuendo of dicta-
torial and corrupt power). 
Charges of TIRed Tape rr 
Another example in which Ickes demonstrated the char-
acteristic of a quick reply to charges to&place when he was 
scheduled to make a speech before a mayor 1 s conference at 
11 A Century of Progress 11 exposition at Chicago in 1934. The 
afternoon before he was to deliver the speech, Ickes was given 
a copy of the resolutions on public works approved by the con-
ference earlier that day, which charged that the public works 
l The New York Times, April 5, 1933, p. 6. 
2Ibid. 
II 
program was being retarded because of red tape. On reading 
these resolutions Ickes got "hot under the collar 11 • 1 He 
64 
quickly wrote a reply to the charges marking it for insertion 
into the speech he was to make that night (copies of which had 
already gone out to the newspapers with a release date). 2 
Ickes 1 description of his delivery of that portion of the 
speech is recounted in his diary . 
I looked those mayors in the eye and I toldthem what the 
exact truth was--that the reason the public works pro-
gram was delayed was because they and others like them, 
and governors of states, didn ' t get their projects into 
us but were trying to excuse their own delay and inepti-
tude by blaming us. I called for facts and specifications 
and told them not to indulge in any more generalities. I 
deplored their joining in a hue and cry without knowing 
what the . facts were, and finally I challenged them to 
appoint a subcommittee to send to Washington to find out 
just what we were doing and if we weren't doing it right, 
to tell us where we were wrong.3 
Ickes ' answer to the mayor's charges was basically not 
defensive but offensive. Perhaps he had followed the advice 
of his old friend Charles Merriam who cautioned him not to 
allow himself to get on the rnfensive. 4 It will be noted that 
Ickes seldom did let himself be put on the defensive . 
Another instance of this offensive characteristic in 
Ickes persuasion is found in his charges on October, 1933 that 
Pennsylvania and eight other states were 11 dilatory 11 in spend-
ing their Federal allotments on highways. This charge by 
1 Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 96. 2Ibid. 
--
3Ibid. , p. 97. 4 Ibid. 
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Ickes1 came at a time when the PWA was being criticized mostly 
because of the slowness of the projects ' appropriations. 
Ickes' charges that the money alloted was not being put to use 
fast enough by the agencies that it was alloted to, trans-
ferred the blame of "dilatoriness" from the Public Works Ad-
ministration to the state agencies. These charges also put 
the enemy on the defensive. 
The Al Smith Battle 
On December l, 1933, Pierce Miller, a correspondent 
for the Hearst News Service, showed Harold Ickes a release 
from Al Smith attacking the Public Works Administration. 
Smith's charges were that the PWA was a "crazy top - heavy 
structure, choked with red tape and bureaucracy" and that the 
Civil Works Administration was being formed by the New Dealers 
for the purpose of covering up the "breakdown of PWA 11 • 2 With 
the usual celerity Ickes dictated a statement of two or three 
hundred words to Miller and called Mike Straus to prepare 
copies of the statement to the other press agencies.3 I ckes' 
words appearing in The New York Times that same day read: 
Mr . Smith is permitting his resentment against the ad-
ministration to run away with his judgment. . . . He is 
making another mistake. He is apparently under the il-
1The New York Times, October 8, 1933, Part rv, p. 7. 
2The New York Times, December l, 1933, p. l. 
3Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol . I, p. 128. 
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lusion that the coining of sarcastic phrases and the hurl-
ing of epithets will be misunderstood by sober-minded 
citizens for sound reasoning based upon careful study of II 
the facts. The Public Works Administration has func-
tioned efficiently to date in spite of Smith and will sur-
vive this latest outburst. The Civil Works Adminis-
tration was a logical development of the public works 
program. Its conception denoted real statesmanship. It 
was designed to and, in fact, is taking up the slack in 
employment that in the nature of things the Public Works 
Administration could not hope to reach. The people 
understand thoroughly what is the matter with Mr. Smith. 
Even those who love him and have delighted to follow him 
in the past feel too deep a pity for him to want to en-
gage in a personal controversy. 
In this invective and sarcastic statement there are 
many elements worth examining. First of all, Ickes intimated 
that Smith's attack was an emotionally based personal ven-
detta while allying his own cause with "the facts" and "sound 
reasoning". When he talked about "sober-minded" citizens, 
he was using flattery and group appeal to induce the people 
to accept his conclusions. (Since most persons wish to con-
sider themselves "sober-minded", they would reject the pro-
posals of Smith . ) Ickes also implied that Smith is trying to 
fool the public. Finally, he illustrated his "gentlemanlike" 
qualities as contrasted to Smith 1 s "outburst" by stating that 
he would not engage in any "personal controversy" and by ex-
pressing his "pity" for Smith. 
Another battle between Smith and Ickes occurred when 
Smith attacked the New Deal policies and PWA indirectly by 
1The New York Ti;es, December l, 1933, p. 8. 
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referring to them, in a speech before the Liberty League, as ~ 
being "communistic". Ickes was scheduled to be a guest speaker 
at the Town Hall Forum in Washington the next day and while 
working on his speech that evening he made a point to listen 
to Smith 1 s address over the radio. In his secret diary, Ickes 
commented that he though it was a good political speech but 
that it suffered because of Smith 1 s 11 bad radio voice" as evi-
denced by his unintelligible pronunciation. He also noted 
that there was "an answer" to most of Smithts charges . 1 That 
same night Mike Straus telephoned Ickes and told him of a de-
fense made by Al Smith in 1928, when he was a candidate for 
President, to a charge by Herbert Hoover that Smith was advo-
cating a soc ialistic state. Hoover had made this charge in a 
speech at Madison Square Garden and Smith, two or three days 
later, had replied to it in Boston . In answering, Smith had 
said that the cry of socialism had always been raised by 
powerful interests that desired to put a damper upon pro-
gressive legislation. It was raised, according to him, by 
reactionary elements in the Republican party and he had fought 
it for twenty-five years . 
Ickes told Straus to write the incident up and deliver 
it to him the next day at the Town Hall Forum in the Shoreham 
Hotel. Since Senator Alben Barkley, the Democratic congress-
-
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 526. 
II 
0 
68 
man from Kentucky was on the panel , I ckes told Strau s to ask 
Barkley to put a question to I ckes that would give him a 
chance to quote the colloquy between Hoover and Smith . Bark-
ley did this and accordi ng to Ickes , the way that the inc i-
dent was handled by him and what was said: '' brought down the 
house . II He said: 11 The audience just loved it and the news -
papers grabbed it off . nl 
According to The New York Times of January 27, 1936, 
I cke s 1 appearance on the Town Hall Forum consisted mainly of 
"quoting Governor Smith against himself in much the same man-
ner as the New Yorker himself uses. " 2 Barkley had begun by 
asking Ickes if it were not true that on January 8, 1933, Mr . 
Smith called for a national public works dictator and sug-
gested that the United States put the Constitution on the 
shelf. To this Ickes declined to comment. (We might hypo-
thesize that perhaps Ickes refused to comment because he was 
afraid that these same charges of "dictator " might be leveled 
at himself since he did have quite a centralized control over 
the Public Works Administration . ) When Barkley stated (as 
previously arranged with Michael Straus) that he recalled as 
campaign manager for Smith in 1928, there had been a contro -
versy as to what constituted socialism, I ckes then replied: 
libid. 
2The New York Times, January 27, 1936, p. 2. 
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!!By a strange coincidence I have Mr. Smith's exact statement 
here."l He then quoted Smith attacking Hoover for raising 
the cry of socialism and then he repeated the Smith statement 
of the previous night, finishing the comparison off by sar-
castically remarking: 11 Well, here we are." 2 Ickes then 
launched into a general attack on the critics of public out-
lays as !!timid salesmen and economists" who defended an Hil-
logical theory!! that business must be stimulated, but without 
government aid. Remarking on the criticisms of the use of 
many advisors to approve projects and examine them, he again 
used sarcasm by saying: 
We have been properly ridiculed for drafting the brains 
of specialists to help us solve our social and economic 
problems ... that too, is un-American . Brains 
should not be used to help the government but to get what 
they can out of the government.) 
Ickes continued his speech by saying that the Public Works 
Administration had not really been tried yet and that the 
billions that had already been spent were but a 11 drop in the 
eye!!. 4 
Smith ' s attack had been incisive and Ickes felt the 
need of a quick reply. He had repeated his method of refer-
ring to ''facts!! in this reply. In this case Hthe facts!! were 
in the form of "exact" quotations from the speech that Smith 
libid. 2Ibid. 
--
3Ibid. 4Ibid. 
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had made in answer to Hoover. By doing this, Ickes was at-
tempting to place Smith in the role of a hypocrite since it 
seemed, in the light of the past statement , that Smith had 
entirely reversed his position. Ickes also tried to make 
Smith's charges invalid by implying that the Public Works Ad-
ministration had not really been given a chance and that the 
entire plan of the administration could not be fairly eval-
uated since it was not completed. As usual, Ickes was quite 
sarcastic in his attack on those who criticized the use of lr 
11 expertsrr on projects. He inferred that these critics were 
trying to cheat the government by fostering lax administration 
and in the absence of rrexperts 11 and rrbrain s 11 would try to 
fleece the government of funds. Here again Ickes used the 
techniques of offense rather than the defense, and slurring 
the opponent by innuendo. 
The Blackmail Incident 
Many persons who hold high public office are con-
fronted with situations where people try to blackmail them for 
past behavior. Icke s was not exception . One such incident 
concerned Lucius Malmin, a former Federal Judge of the Virgin 
Islands during the Wilson Administration and C. W. Larson, a 
Chicago attorney. While he was still in Chicago after his 
appointment as Secretary of the Interior, Icke s received a 
visit from Larson in connection with an estate which Ickes, in 
his function as a lawyer, had settled the year before . Lar-
II 
II 
son had been hired by an heir, who was not satisfied with the 
settlement, to check into any irregularities. Charging that 
there were irregularities, Larson threatened to file a pe-
tition with the probate court which would accuse Ickes of 
fraud. Ickes immediately called up the State's Attorney and 
asked him to investigate the matter. The State ' s Attorney 
sent for Larson and the case was dropped when he could not 
prove the charges. On July 13 , 1933, Malmin appeared in Wash-
ington with papers regarding the Larson charges and told 
Harry Slattery, Ickes 1 personal assistant, that if Ickes 
didn't make him Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands he 
would petition the Bar Association of Chicago to disbar I ckes, 
and that he would also send a statement to the newspapers in 
connection with the matter. Upon hearing of this, Ickes 
called in Louis Glavis, the Director of Investigations in the 
Interior Department and a stenographer. Ickes made plans to 
have them hide just inside the door leading into his office 
to take down an interview that he was to have with Malmin, so 
that a case of attempted blackmail could be established. 1 In 
his private diary Ickes described the interview in these words: 
II I talked to him for some twenty minutes to half an hour 
and tried to get him to threaten me, but without success . 
He did tell me that he had the papers and that the law-
yer was thinking of filing them. He told me that he could 
prevent it and that he was going to prevent it. I not 
only gave him a chance to ask me for some consideration 
in the way of a political favor for holding back, but in 
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol . I, p. 64. 
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the end, in my desperation, I asked him blankly what he 
expected me to do if he did have the lawyer drop the 
matter. He told me that he wouldn't do anything; that 
the lawyer would follow his advice and that I could be 
assured that nothing would come of it. I told him that 
I didn't care what the lawyer did; that he could go and 
jump in the lake so far as I was concerned. And I made 
no promises to Malmin. He begged me to arrange for an 
appointment for him with the President, but I told him 
that appointments had to be made through Colonel Mcintyre 
and I couldn't make an appointment for him.l 
On September of 1933, Malmin sent a letter to the Pres~~ 
ident and Mrs. Roosevelt asking for an arrangement satisfac-
tory to him and that it was important if they were intereste d 
in preventing a scandal which might reflect to a man close to 
them in the Administration. Previously Ickes had told the 
President of the incident and the Attorney General, Homer 
Cummings, was called in. He, in turn, put J. Edgar Hoover, 
head of the Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Jus-
tice on the case. At that time Ickes stated in his diary: (, 
I have told Malmin and I have told everyone to whom I 
have talked on the subject that they could go ahead and 
fire both barrels whenever they want to. If I am guilty 
of any unprofessional conduct or for committing any 
crime or misdemeanor in handling the Saunders' estate 
case, I don't know what it is.2 
With the approval of the President, Ickes filed a dis-
barment petition against Malmin and Larson before the Chicago 
Bar Association on the grounds of blackmail for Federal ap-
pointment.3 At the proceedings on June, 1934, Ickes was cross-
libid., pp. 64, 65. 2Ibid., pp. 89, 90. 
3one of these gentlemen brought a suit for slander in 
l 
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examined by Malmin. News Week magazine recorded that when 
Malmin attempted to put Ickes in bad light by asking him about 
the matter of Ickes' wife's divorce from Professor James 
Thompson, Ickes retorted: "In addition to proving you 1re a 
blackmailer, you 1re proving you are a blackguard." 1 Comment-
ing on the effect of Malmin 1 s personal charges and his retort, 
Ickes wrote in his private diary: "He shut up after that, but 
of course an opportunity was furnished to the rotten Chicago 
1
1 
Tribune to try to spread around a little dirt. "2 
I Essentially Ickes' handling of the Malmin charges 
were not defensive but offensive. We might say that he fought 
"fire with fire" by instituting disbarment proceedings against 
Malmin and Larson; the same action that Malmin had threatened 
him with. He was certainly quick to retaliate when Malmin 
made threats to smear him. Instead of just denying the charges 
made against him, he exposed his opponents' efforts to black-
mail him and searched for other charges to make against them. 
Ickes seemed to feel that to take a~se like this before the 
public was the wisest thing t o do. He had a faith in his abil-
the amount of $250,000 against Ickes upon hearing of the dis-
barment action. Questioned by the press about the slander 
suit, Ickes said: "He flatters me in two respects--first, that 
I could conceivably damage his reputation and, second, that 
he could collect $250,000 if he got a judgment against me." 
The New York Times, August 15, 1934, p. 8. 
l"Ickes, Accuser: Blackmail Charged Against Two Law-
yers," News Week, III (June 16, 1934), p. 22. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 167. 
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ity to fightrnck and a belief in the public 1 s ability to 
judge a case such as this and arrive at a fair decision, if 
given all sides of the matter. Certainly a scandal such as 
this, if not properly handled, could have done much harm to 
Ickesr reputation as the Administrator of the Public Works 
Administration. 
The Moses Incident 
There were instances where Ickes had to 11 play politicsll 
and found it difficult sometimes to extricate himself from 
the resultant embarassing position. Probably the most publi-
cized instance of this type related to the Public Works Admin-
istration. ~concerned Robert Moses and the Triborough Bridge 
Authority in New York. At the instance of the President (to 
whom Moses had been a bitter personal enemy), Ickes talked to 
Mayor LaGuardia on February of 1934 about having Moses re-
moved from his position as a member of the Triborough Bridge 
Authority. LaGuardia did not heed the request but Ickes re-
frained from any more pressure on him during the gubernatorial 
campaign in New York when Moses was the Republican candidate. 
Ickes did this in order to avoid a charge that he was playing 
l . t. l po l lCS. 
In November, after the election (and the defeat of 
Moses), Ickes struck off a list of projects pending for New 
1 Ibid. , p . 2 29 . 
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York City in order to re sume pressure on LaGuardia to take 
action. I ckes wrote in his diary: 
Since the election I have cal led LaGuardia twice. The 
last time he told me he could not get rid of Moses, un-
less he was willing to resign, without preferring charges. 
I told him that that was his funeral and not mine and 
that I did not see any reason why we should be expected 
to go in on a federal project with a man who criticized 
the Federal Administration as bitterly as Moses has. 
Accordingly, I have decided not to make allocations for 
any more projects in New York City until this matter has 
been adjusted, and I am considering refusing to honor 
requisitions for funds on pending projects.I 
After leading Ickes to believe that he would not re-
appoint Moses after the expiration of his term, LaGuardia wrote 
Icke s that he would reappoint Moses. Ickes took a further 
step and i ssued a general order which stated that he, as Pub-
lie Works Administrator, would not honor another project where 
the supervising author ity also held a state or local office. 
This action was aimed specifically at Moses who, along with 
being on the Tri-Borough Bridge Authority was New York City 
Park Commissioner. LaGuardia showed the order to Moses and 
Moses gave it to the newspapers with a bitter statement. 
The press made headlines of the incident and Ickes was 
put in unfavorable light. When asked if the President had 
had any hand in the matter, Ickes lied and replied to the ne-
gative. Event~ally, however, it was s urmised by the news-
papers that the President did have a part in the incident. 
libid. 
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As a result, Ickes was pictured, by some magazine and news-
paper writers, as a martyr for trying to protect the Pres-
ident.1 
In connection with this incident we must note Ickes 1 
use of humor to minimize the seriousness of his actions. At 
a Dutch Treat Club luncheon in New York on January 26, before 
newspapermen, editors and publishers (who were expatiating at 
length in their columns about the Moses incident), Ickes rose 
to his feet and remarked that the chairman had introduced him 
as the Secretary of the Interior, whereas, to judge from the 
newspapers, he should have been introduced as 11 Pharoah 1 s 
daughter". He later remarked in his diary that this statement 
"brought down the house" and got him off to a good start in 
his speech. 2 
Ickes also mentioned in his diary that this Moses in-
cident was the only thing that hurt him in the public estim-
ation at that time since the newspapers throughout the coun-
try had cited it as an example of PWA being used for politi -
cal purposes. He said that he regretted the incident very 
much and felt that his action in the matter was out of keeping 
with his whole record and with his political philosophy.3 At 
1
"Buffer: Knocks Along With Praise," News Week, V 
(February 2, 1935), p. 9. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol . I , pp. 277, 278 . 
3Ibid. , P. 291. 
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a cabinet meeting, remarking on how Ickes was taking the public 
abuse for the incident, the President pointed out that every-
one had to have a whipping post and that Ickes had been his 
since the resignation of Hugh Johnson . 1 
Because of the constant pressure from the critics of 
the administration, Ickes was finally forced to reinterpret 
the Order 129 in the case of Moses. He was asked by the Pres -
ident to revise the draft of a letter, (which would be made 
public) to LaGuardia in regard to this matter. Ickes had 
this to say about the portion of this letter criticizing Moses 
for the attacks he made as the Republican candidate for Gov-
ernor of New York against the then Governor Lehman, while 
holding two separate positions by favor of Lehman: 
I put a lot more teeth in this portion of the President's 
letter in my redraft. In fact, I made it quite savage . 
However, I am doubtful whether the letter shoul d take up jl 
any political issue at all since that would have the 
effect of admitting what has been charged since Order No. 
129 has been issued, whi2h is that the reason underlying 
that order was politics . 
As evidenced by these revisions in the President's letter, 
Ickes certainly did not like the idea of retreating in the 
face of ~ttacks. He could not refrain from taking a last 
punch. 
Foreign Contracts Charges 
Another instance when I ckes was under pressure to re-
libid. 2Ibid . , p . 309. 
0 
treat on a previous stand came when he was criticized for de -
priving American workers of employment, by giving steel con-
tracts for the Triborough Bridge and the Morehead City pro -
jects to German companies . Letters of protest were issued by 
William Green (the President of the American Federation of 
Labor) and Matthew Woll, (an AFL vice - president ) and there was 
much newspaper publ i city about the incident. Ickes was placed 
in the dilemma of recognizing the force of public opinion that 
was being stimulated and brought to bear and also of handling 
the matter without being in the position of beating a hasty 
retreat. 1 
',' 1 Finally, he released to the press a letter, sent to 
II 
Green, in which he refused to admit that in certain circum-
stances foreign building supplies could not be bought from 
Germany . He accused American manufacturers of collusive bid-
ding and he said that they had forced the buying of foreign 
materials because of their unreasonable prices. Writing about 
the results of this letter in his private diary, Ickes sa i d: 
11 As the result of my letter to Green and my press conference 
the newspaper accounts this morning, even in the Hearst press, 
were considerably toned down . 112 
Results such as those cited by I ckes in his diary must 
have affirmed his belief that attack was the best method to 
1Ibid., p . 469. 2I bid . , p . 470. 
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deal with charges by his enemies. In this case when he was 
attacked for dealing with the German companies his tactic was 
to place the blame on the American manufacturers by an attack 
on them. 
The Talmadge Battle 
Ickes' first clash with Governor Eugene Talmadge of 
Georgia came when the latter criticized the wage scale of the 
Public Works Administration. Ickes replied to this criticism 
by calling Talmadge 11 his chain gang excellency 11 and saying 
that the Governor's words could not be trusted. He added: 
II 11 really I don't pay much attention to anything his chain gang 
excellency says. 111 When told that Talmadge was going to ap -
pear on the radio, Ickes remarked: 11 I think the more the peo -
II 
ple of this country see Governor Talmadge and hear him, the 
better it will be for President Roosevelt and any man he ap -
proves. 112 
At a convention at Macon, Georgia in January 29, Tal-
madge retaliated by charging that the Secretary of Interior 
had illegally bought certain Georgia road certificates in con-
!! nection with some PWA projects and had tried to make him a 
., 
party to the action . In his press conference the next day, 
Ickes produced photo - static copies of a letter sent to him 
1The New York Times, January 22, 1936, p. 17. 
2Ibid. 
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from Talmadge 11 beseeching 11 Ickes to accept the highway certi -
ficates . 1 
Wi th a combination of humor, name - call i ng, belittling 
and re f e r ence to unassai l able fact, I ckes fought the Ta l madge 
attacks. Again, here i s evidence of his abil i ty to make a 
quick reply . 
The Book: Back to Work 
Ickesr activities to publicize and defend the activi-
ties of the Public Works Admi nistration were not limited to 
speeches and comments in the newspapers and magazines . I n 
1935 he also wrote a book, Back to Work, which served as a 
medium for certain propaganda which he wanted to disseminate. 
I n reviewing the book the Li terary Digest stated: 11 The Sec -
retary of the Interior is a two - fisted man and when he sets 
out to write a history of the Public Works Administration, he 
inc l udes in that task a vigorous excoriation of his critics . n2 
In that volume, Ickes covered the history of the Pub -
lie Works Administration up to that time . He told of the 
hardships of forming the organizational structure, the l ong 
hours of work, the political grafters trying to get funds, 
the proposals for money to finance round trips to the moon 
lThe New York Times, January 31, 1936, p. 3. 
2Review of Back to Work by Harold L. Ickes, Literary 
Digest, CXI X (June 29, 1935 ) , p. 26 . 
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and the relentless job of his administration to make sure that 
l 
the funds were adequately used. 
Ickes' thesis in this book seemed to be that planning 
was needed for public works and without it, waste and cor -
ruption would be rampant. 2 By giving this point of view, he 
was justifying the slowness of PWA allocations . 
Conclusions 
Whether I ckes' three goals to : (l) make sure that 
there was no waste and corruption in the administration, (2) 
allocate money for the building of useful public works of 
social value and lasting benefit and (3) increase employment 
through the projects, were fully achieved, is a matter of 
which we are not primarily concerned with here. Suffice to 
say, that Harold I ckes ' administration of the PWA was for the 
most part, efficient, honest and effective. The public, how -
ever, would probably never have appreciated what good work 
was being done had it not been for the comprehensive job of 
persuasion and propaganda that was carried out under I ckes ' 
direction . Through speeches, newspaper releases and articles, 
magazine articles and a book, he informed the public of the 
work of the PWA and protected himself from critics by retal-
-----------------1 -1Harold L. Ickes, Back 
mill an Company, 1935 ) ' p . 99 . 
2Ibid., pp. 227, 228 . 
to Work ( New York: The Mac -
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iating with barrages of attacks on them. He did his best to 
communicate to the people of the United States the success 
that the Public Works Administration was achieving in its 
goals. 
0 
CHAPTER V 
CONSERVATION 
Background 
During the New Deal administration, conservation 
played an important role in the reform measures instituted. 
The Civilian Conservation Corps advanced the cause of re-
forestration. The Agricultural Adjustment Act pointed to-
ward better agricultural planning, as in taking submarginal 
lands out of production. The Tennessee Valley Authority ad-
vanced the cause of the utilization of water power and the 
irrigation of arid lands. 
Like his hero, Theodore Roosevelt, one of Harold 
Ickes' main interests was conservation of the natural re-
sources of America. He was a lover of the natural beauty of 
wildlife. As a garden enthusiast he raised prize winning dah-
lias. In his position as Secretary of the Interior he had 
dominion over the system of national parks and he constantly 
fought the commercialization of these areas. When questioned 
about this subject, he said: tri'd rather see a flower growing 
anytime in a mountain area than I . would to see a filling-sta-
tioned billboarded highway going thru. 1 
1Dorothy Pletcher Howerth, trGardener Harold L. Ickes,n 
Better Homes and Gardens, XIII (January, 1935), p. 51. 
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Ickes also saw the importance of preserving the coun-
tryts natural resources . The waste of resources through ex-
ploitation and inadequate planning appalled him . As the ad-
ministrator of the Public Works Administration he alloted a 
great deal of money to the Civilian Conservation Corps and to 
other projects to build dams and to provide for the reclam-
ation of land. As Chairman of the Oil Conservation Board he 
fought for the discreet use of that resource. 
When Ickes became the Secretary of the Interior, the 
conservation activities of the government were in various de -
partments. For example, the Department of Agriculture had 
jurisdiction over the Division of Forestry while the National 
Park Service was in the Department of the Interior . Ickes 
felt that all the conservation functions of the federal gov-
ernment should be under one department and he believed that 
the Interior Department should have that duty. He therefore 
advocated the change of name from the Department of Interior 
to the Department of Conservation. 
Early in his career as Secretary of the Interior he 
spoke to the President of his interest in conservation. His 
two goals were to: (1) build a strong public opinion in favor 
of conservation1 and (2) create a Department of Conservation 
under his leadership. 
lickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p . 280. 
l 
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These goals of Ickes will be discussed in this chap -
ter . We will examine his use of persuasive elements in his 
quest to bring about their realization. 
Building a Strong Public Opinion 
for Conservation 
Throughout his career, Ickes ' efforts to make the pub -
lie aware of the need of conservation resulted in speeches, 
magazine articles and press releases issued by him and his de -
partment expounding this cause . His propaganda in this area 
dealt with these main subjects : (1) the "wasters" of the na-
tural resources, (2) the importance of natural resources to 
national security, and (3) the meaning of conservation to the 
common man. 
Attacking "the wasters'' -- In attacking "the wasters 11 of natur -
al resources, Ickes used the propaganda techniques of name -
calling, innuendo and transference. 1 An example of his use 
of innuendo in ridiculing the people who did not conserve the 
natural resources of the nation is noted in an article by 
Ickes in Collier's magazine in which he commented on the oil 
shortage. 2 In this article he wrote about the people who, he 
felt, kept the public misinformed about the shortage and there-
lAn excellent explanation of these techniques is set 
forth in: Alfred McClung Lee and Elisabeth Briant Lee (eds.), 
The Fine Art of Propaganda (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com-
pany, 1939) 
2Harold L. Ickes, "That Oil Shortage," Collier's , 
CVIII (October 18, 1941), p. 13 . 
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by kept consumption of oil h igh when conservation should have 
been in effect. Talking about the misconceptions that he be-
lieved these people created, he stated that he hoped he could 
c lear away the confusion made by (as he expressed it): "cer-
tain groups and individuals whose motivation would make an 
entertaining study ."1 He called them "backslappers, corridor-
whisperers and statistical prestidigitators 11 • 2 By allying 
these opponents of conservation with deceit and trickery he 
was hoping to earn adherents to his cause. 
In a speech before the Chicago Dental Society in 1934, 
Icke s allied the wasters of natural resources with the 11 evil s 11 
of big business: 
No man has a right to live in soft luxury through the em-
ployment of women and children of tender years, at toil-
some back-breaking tasks beyond their strength, for wage s 
insufficient to support themselves in decency . No man 
has a right to become a multimillionaire through the 
waste or willful destruction of essential natura l re-
sources especially if sue~ destruction means loss of pro-
perty and life to others. 
This statement was obviously designed to arouse the audience 
emotionally. The use of loaded words such as 11 soft luxury11 , 
"tender years" and "back-breaking"; the exaggeration in talk-
' ing about multimillionaires in relation to the l oss of life, 
is evidence of this emotional appeal. I ckes fir st talks about 
the malpractices of management which had b~en associated with 
1Ibid. 2Ibid. 
3The New York Time s, February 27, 1934, p. 8. 
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"big business" and then brings in the unrelated subject of 
waste of natural resources. This sequence of sentences tends 
to transfer the evil connotations of the former to the latter. 
In another speech at the completion ceremonies of the 
Retch Hetchy project near San Francisco , he talked about the 
"ruthless" destruction of forests, range lands, water sheds 
and the over-production of oil and natural gas , blaming it on 
"rugged individualismH (his name for big businessmen) seeking 
quick profits. 1 Here again he was using words laden with neg-
a tive meanings to describe those who wasted the natural re-
source s. 
Icke s often called his enemies names which he knew had 
evil connotations to the public. For example, when he was 
trying to put certain oil conservation practices into operation 
he condemned those who did not want to cooperate with him as 
being "Fascist 11 • 2 
Showing the importance of natural 
resources to national security-- Immediately before, during 
and after World War II the shortagffiof oil and other re sources 
were particularly acu~ and Ickes took advantage of this sit-
uation to point out to the public the importance of conser-
vation. In a speech before the North American Wildlife Con-
1The New York Times, October 29, 1934, p. ll . 
2
"Mr. Icke s ' Arabian Nights," Fortune, XXIX (June, 
1944)' p. 123. 
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ference i n Washington, D. C. , in 1940 , Ickes remarked that war 
was a lesson to the United States on the need of nurturing 
1 
resources . 
In another Collier ' s article , (l942) Ickes wrote : 11 To 
win the war, as well as the peace, we must husband our oil. 11 2 
I n this same article he depicted Hitler as trying to get con-
trol of world oi l resources so as to strengthen his power . 
Ickes , here was using a definite fear appeal to arouse his au-
dience. He presented the idea that to prevent the decline of 
the United States as a major military and industrial power and 
to maintain the high standard of living, there must be action 
taken to increase and conserve oil and other mineral re-
sources.3 
Expounding the importance of natural 
resources to the common man-- I n his efforts to effect an in-
crease in conservation activities, Ickes appealed to the aver -
age American. He placed conservation in the context of the 
life of the common man . I n an article called 11 Saving the Good 
Earth" (a title which, by the way, might appeal to the s enti -
ments of a large segment of the American public), Ickes pointed 
1The New York Times , March 19, 1940 , p . 28 . 
2Harold L. Ickes, 11 Hitler Reaches for the World ' s Oil, 11 
Collier's, CX (August 15, 1942), p. 20 . 
3Harold L. Ickes, "The War and Our Vanishing Resour -
ces," The American Magazine, CXL (December , 1945), pp. 20, 21, 
22, 128, 129 . 
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out t o every citizen the importance of t he prevent ion of 
erosion . He s t ressed the "tragedy " of the many "hard-working" 
families in the Missisippi Valley who t ried t o t ill lan d that 
"cracks and cakes", giving meager y ields. 1 
When the need for oil conservation was prevalent , he 
pointed out in magazine artic les 2 and speeches3 what a l oss 
of this res ource would mean to eac h citizen. In an ar t icle 
ent i tled nHow to Keep Warm This Wintern , he pointed out that 
no t conserving oil would mean cold homes during the winter 
months. 4 By spelling out the import ance of conser va t ion in 
every day t erms he was using an effec t i ve means of arousing the 
public t o reac t favorably to his persuasion . 
The Campaign for a Department 
of Conservat ion 
As ment ioned previously , in his ambition to create a 
1Harold L. Ic kes , "Saving the Good Earth,n Survey Gra-
phic XXIII (February , 1934), p . 57. 
2i.e. :Harold L. Ickes, nBa tt le of Oil,n Nation, CLV 
(August 1 1942) . pp . 86- 7. 
Harold L. Ickes, nPlenty of Oil, But How t o Ge t I t ,'' 
Collier's , CX (August 8 , 1942), pp. 14 -16 ff . 
Harold L. Ickes, "That Oil Shortage , " Collier 's , CVIII 
(October 18, 1941) , p. 13 ff. 
3i . e . : The New York Times, September 2, 1943, p . 1. 
(report ing a speech given by Ickes over the radio in which he 
appealed for cuts i n all but essential automob ile driving to 
conserve oil and ga s ) 
4Harold L. Icke s, 11 How to Keep Warm This Winter , n The 
New York Times Magazine, Sep t ember 27, 1942, p. 10. 
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department which would have all the federal authority necess -
ary for the preservation and development of natural resources, 
Ickes wanted the Department of Interior changed into a Depart-
ment of Conservation in name and in fact. As evidenced by 
the entries in his diary, he was continually trying to support 
this change by t ransferring divisions of other departments of 
the government, concerned with a conservation function, to 
his Department of Interior. He also encouraged the intro-
duction of bills into Congress calling for reorganization of 
the government along these lines. 
One of the first departments which would be affected 
in this reorganization would be the Forestry Division (under 
the direction of Gifford Pinchot) in the Department of Agri-
culture. Pinchot and others were opposed to IckesT plan and 
as a result, a characteristic Ickes httle was initiated. 
In terms of persuasion, Ickes 1 campaign for a Depart-
ment of Conservation can be considered in two main aspec ts . 
First of all, his general campaign to convince the public that 
the change was necessary and advisable. It can also be con-
sidered from the standpoint of the individual battles that he 
had with the opponents of his objective. 
Convi ncing the public of the need for 
a Department of' Conservation-- In the campaign to convince the 
public that there was need for a Department of Conservation, 
Ickes wrote ar t icles and gave speeches expounding the impor-
tance of conservation in general (as discussed in the begin-
ning of this chapter). Along with this persuasion, however, 
he stressed the need for the centralization of all conser -
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vation activities in one department under, as he put it, a 
"sincere conservationist". 1 He pointed out, for instance, in 
a speech before the American Game Conference in 1935, that 
such centralization would stop interdepartmental conflicts, 
still jealousies among government officials and open an oppor-
tunity to drive ahead along a broad front in the conservation 
cause. 2 
Again in a speech before the North American Wildlife 
Conference in Washipgton in 1936, he emphasized the necessity 
for a "united" front of conservationists to combat influences 
which he said would exploit natural resources. He called for 
a cohesive, aggressive organization.3 By criticizing "ex-
ploiters" and identifying them with something evil Ickes made 
himself appear as the crusader of justice and reform. He ma de 
attacks on pressure groups and their "greediness" which he 
said resulted in "ill-conceived legislation" and he accused 
them of trying t o "stifle 11 the conservation activities in the 
lThe New York Times, January 23, 1935, p. 7. 
2Ibid. 
3The New York Times, February 7, 1936, p. 21 . 
Department of Interior. 1 He pointed out that if a national 
conservation policy was to be followed seriously , as nself-
preservationn demanded, a Department of Conservation would 
be the natural agency within which to concentrate these ac-
tivitie s . 2 
Ickes also tried to convince the public of the cri -
tica l necessity for this change . He warned of the ncrisis 
which impends in our social and economic order " which, as he 
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put it, made it necessary to "let somebody hold the wheel who 
knows enough not to let go. 11 3 It was in words such as these 
that he attempted to convey to the public his sincerity and 
intensive interest in the cause of conservation. 
Ickes also equated his fight for a Department of Con -
servation with the will of the majority and with high status 
figures which he knew the public would respect. He talked of 
the demands of the nrank and filen and of the support of the 
President whom he called nthe great conservationistn. 4 
The fights to defeat particular 
opponents -- In his plans to reorganize the government depart-
ments, Ickes considered his greatest opponents to be Gifford 
1Harold L. Ickes, "Department of Conservation,n Vital 
Speeches, III (September l, 1937), pp . 693-695. 
2Ibid., p. 694. 
3The New York Times, February 28, 1939, p . 2 . 
4Ibid . 
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Pinchot, the head of the Forestry Division, and Henry Wallace, 
the Secretary of Agriculture, under whose juristiction the 
Forestry Division lay. Ac cordingly the majority of his at -
tacks were leveled at these men. His denunciations were not 
confined only to Pinchot and Wallace, however. Calling other 
opponents " little cliques of one - track-mind cons ervationists 
concerned only with their own selfish ends 11 and using other 
derogatory statements, were still part of his battle ammu-
nition.1 
An example of Ickes' frankness and quick reply came in 
May 16, 1935, at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Expen-
ditures in the Executive Departments which was examining Ickes' 
bill to change the name of the Department of Interior to the 
Department of Conservation and Works. Chief Forester F. A. 
Silcox and other members of the Forest Service, under the dir -
ection of Gifford Pinchot and Henry Wallace, appeared to oppose 
the change in name. Ickes recorded in his diary that he be-
came impatient with the character of the opposition and ex-
pressed himself quite frankly on the subject, not mincing 
matters much . 2 
The verbal repartee that occurred at that committee 
hearing gives us some insight into the invective and offensive 
techniques of Ickes: 
lThe New York Times, January 23, 1935, p. 7. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. 364, 365. 
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Mr. Silcox. I think the fundamental conception of 
conservation upon which a department can be organized is 
a fallacy .... I do not know where you would draw the 
line. Would you have conservation of child life, or 
public health or all organic resources, in a department, 
all under con~ervation? Where would you draw the line ? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Secretary Ickes. I think that criticism of a name is 
rather a nice and fanciful criticism. I am not prepared 
to enter into any metaphysical discussion as to what con-
servation may or may not mean . 
The Chairman. 
this bill in its 
Bureau, of which 
trol? 
Mr. Silcox. 
would. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Does it seem to you, Mr. Silcox, that 
operation would remove the Forestry 
you are head, out of the present con-
I am asking the question whether it 
Secretary Ickes. 
would? 
Do you mean whether the bill itself 
Mr. Silcox. No; the bill itself would not . And I do 
not want to be maneuvered into a position that I have any 
lack of confidence, or intend to express and in the 
slightest degree, against entrusting the President with 
authority to make any shifts in the Departments that he 
may think proper, by giving him that authority. 
I want to put myself on record clearly as not having 
any such opinion. But the question I have asked is not 
a metaphysical question. I have asked a question as to 
conservation as a particular purpose. 
It is not clear how you could draw the line. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Secretary Ickes. If I may be permitted, I will say 
that the President, or Congress, if they wanted to make 
any change as between bureaus in the Department, could do 
so regardless of what the name of the department was. 
As I understand Mr. Silcox's position, he is perfectly 
willing to have the President have his power; but he does 
not want him to have it. Laughter 
Now, this is all highly metaphysical. If the Depart-
ment of Agriculture wanted to change its name, I cannot 
imagine the head of any other department, or the repre-
sentative of any other department, coming in here and ob-
jecting to that change, through some highly technical 
objection based on terminology, or on function. 
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, has the Secretary of 
Agriculture himself intimated to you that in this bill 
there is something that would be embarrassing to him? 
Secretary Ickes. He has not. And I am frank to say 
that I have not any knowledge as to whether he has read 
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it or not, and I doubt very much whether he has read the1 statement that I submitted to you and to this committee. 
On June 27, 1935, before that same committee, Henry 
Wallace appeared to read a statement in opposition to Ickes' 
bill. Following Wallace, Ickes was given an opportunity to 
reply. Relating the incident in his diary Ickes said: 
He had left me some beautiful openings which I took ad-
vantage of in a manner that was not too serious. I kept 
the committee amused as I dissected and answered Henry's 
arguments and even Henry himself had to laugh on one or 
two occasions. The committee had to adjourn before I 
was through on account of a call for a quorum from the 
House, but I carne away feeling that our position had been 
strengthe~ed not only by what I said but by what Henry 
had said. 
Here we find Ickes' use of humor as a conveyance for 
incisive rebuttals. He seemed to have put the emphasis on 
"dissecting" the arguments of his opponents.3 
When the President of the Society of American Fores-
ters, H. H. Chapman, attacked Ickes' plans, Ickes retaliated 
by attributing Chapman's statements to "certain interests" in 
the Forest Service. Ickes then asserted that Chapman was try-
ing to smear him in linking his name with the Albert Fall 
1change the Name of the Department of the Interior and 
Coordinate Certain Governmental Functions . Hearing before the 
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, U. S. 
Senate, 74th Cong., lst Sess., on S. 2665,(Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1935), pp. 10, 11, 12, 13. 
2Ibid. , p. 386. 
3see: Appendix A 
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scandals. 1 Here again Ickes used the tactic of implying the 
presence of ulterior and selfish motives in his opponent. 
He charged that the opponents of his bill were using cam-
paigns that were conceived in "deceit" and born in 11 mental 
dishonesty" . 2 
Probably the most bitter exchange in the conservation 
issue occurred in Ickes 1 battle with Gifford Pinchot. Here 
again we see Ickes 1 quick invective and ability to place the 
opponent in an unflattering light . When Pinchot referred to 
Ickes as an "ambitious power seeker" and an enemy of conser -
vation in a speech before the Isaak Walton League of Chicago 
in 1937, Ickes quickly retorted in a news conference that 
the attack by Pinchot was : 11 in questionable taste 11 and that 
it was a political speech before a non-political organization. 
He charged that Pinchot used unfair tactics in his attacks 
by not giving the other side an opportunity to present its 
case. Ickes implied ulterior motives in Pinchot 1 s speech by 
inquiring, before the newsmen, into the possibility that 
there might be a connection between Pinchot 1 s tirade and the 
report .that he proposed to run for Governor of Pennsylvania 
in 1940.3 
1The New York Times, July 6, 1935, p . 2. 
2The New York Times, February 28, 1939, p. 2. 
3The New York Times, May 2, 1937, p. 8. 
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The culmination of Ickes 1 battle with Pinchot came 
when Ickes published an article nNot Guilty n in the Saturday 
Evening Post1 and in a publication of the Interior Department. 
In this article Ickes revealed that as a result of a study 
of the Ballinger scandal2 in the Department of Interior in 
the early 1900 1s, he had come to the conclusion that Ballin-
ger was destroyed by the machinations of Pinchot, who had 
falsely accused Ballinger of misconduct. 
In this article, Ickes charged that Pinchot was a 
npropagandistn who smeare?- the innocent Ballinger. In talk-
ing about President Taftrs belief that Ballinger was inno-
cent, Ickes said that Taft knew that Theodore Roosevelt was 
right when he characterized Pinchot as a nfanaticn. Ickes 
further portrayed Ballinger as an !! American Dreyfus" and said 
that the American people owed contrition and atonement to 
lccxrr (May 25, 1940), pp. 125, 128 . 
2
rn the summer of 1901, Pinchot, then head of the 
Division of Forestry, accused Secretary of the Interior Rich-
ard A. Ballinger of injuring the conservation program in or-
der to aid corporation interests . Pinchot publicly accused 
Ballinger of helping those who sought to plunder the public 
domain (specifically, water power sites and coal lands in 
Montana and Wyoming). President William H. Taft ordered Pin-
chot1s removal from office on January 7, 1910, on grounds of 
insubordination and a joint Congressional committee, inquir-
ing into the Department of the Interior, sided with Ballinger 
by a majority vote . A bitter controversy took place in the 
newspapers. Ballinger was portrayed by the press as corrupt 
and dishonest and public opinion was aroused against him. On 
March 6, 1911, because of the sentiment opposing him, Ballin-
ger resigned. 
the maligned memory of a 11 fine and devoted 11 public servant. 
Ickes concluded his article with the statement that Pinchot 
had never let up in his remorseless campaign of smearing the 
Department of Interior. 
By exposing this incident and its implications, Ickes 
was making a comparison of Pinchot 1 s persecution of the inno-
cent Ballinger and his charges against Ickes. He was trans-
ferring the guilt of using smear tactics from a past incident 
to the battle at hand. 
Although Ickes' fight with Henry Wallace was not as 
spectacular as the one with Pinchot, it is important enough 
to be mentioned here. Ickes hoped at first to achieve his 
ambitions to get a Department of Conservation by 11 trading 11 
with the Department of Agriculture. He wanted, for example, 
to trade such bureaus in the Department of Interior such as 
Reclamation, General Land Office, Subsistence Homesteads, 
Grazing, and Soil Erosion for the Forestry, Roads and Bio-
logical Bureaus in Agriculture. 
At first, Wallace seemed willing to make the changes 
but as the opposition in the Forest Service increased, he 
became more opposed to the plan. Because of Wallace's oppo-
sition to a bill to change the name of the Department of In-
terior to the Department of Conservation and Works, Ickes 
appeared before Congress and humorously commented on the sad-
ness that he felt at the Department of Agriculture's inter-
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ference in the naming of a 11 baby" which, he s aid, was a 11 fam-
ily affair 11 : 
I had looked on this as a family affair of no interest 
to the neighbors -- something like naming the baby. When 
I heard the testimony presented by the volunteer spokes-
men for the Department of Agriculture, I rejoiced that 
I had not thought of naming the baby 11 Daisy" because the 
gardener undoubtedly would have objected to it on the 
ground that it was a horticultural term. I will admit 
that all of us may not all like the name 11 Daisy 11 , but if 
the fond parents had pre ferred it, why should anybody 
pay attention to the gardener? 1 
Further commenting on the interference of Wallace, 
Ickes said that he had heard of various kinds of government , 
such as oligarchies, monarchies, and democracies, but this 
was the fir st time that he had ever heard of a Hfarmocracy". 
He then disarmingly said that the name "Interior 11 w:ls too in-
elusive a term and that he was trying to limit the name and 
function of his department. Concluding his statements he 
said that after being 11 operated" on by other departments of 
the government only a few 11 vital organs 11 of the Department of 
Interior were left and coincidentally the se few were directly 
related to conservation and public works. 2 
In these statements before the Congress, Ickes used 
the guise of humor to make his listeners receptive to his 
1u. S. House of Repre sentatives, Committee on Expen-
ditures in the Executive Departments, Change Name of Depart-
ment of the Interior to the Department of Conservation and 
Works, Hearings on H.R. 7712, 74th Cong., 1st Ses s ., (Wa sh-
ington: U. S . Government Printing Office, 1935), p. l. 
2Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New 
Deal, (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company , 1959 ), p . 348 . 
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arguments. In effect he said that Wallace was guilty of try-
ing to be a dictator by opposing a matter which he had no 
business expressing an opinion on. By attacking others for 
taking "vital organs" (meaning certain departments and div-
isions), Ickes was attempting to negate any charges that he 
was power-hungry. 
Conclusions 
Although he used all of his ingenuity and energy to 
create a conservation department, Ickes was not successful . 
He pleaded, joked, argued and shifted from logic to sarcasm 
to denunciation but his 1935 bill to change the name of the 
Interior Department was defeated in the House Committee. In 
1936 a similar bill passed the Senate only to be defeated in 
the House. Although we could not consider his quest for a 
Conservation Department a selfish one, certainly Ickes' at-
tacks on his opponents, Pinchot and Wallace, had all the fire 
and bitterness of a personal argument . This emotional char-
acteristic in I ckes ' persuasion is a feature which we might 
keep in mind as various incidents in Ickesr career are re-
viewed. 
It must also be noted that although Ickes used cer-
tain techniques such as "name-calling" and 11 transference 11 
that a propagandist who was impersonal about his subject 
might use, he was of the firm belief that the cause he was 
fighting for was good and just. He felt that it was his per-
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sona l crusade. Since he did get emotional about the subject 
of conservation, his rhetoric was not always based on sound 
reasoning. 
'-
. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BIG BUSINESS 
Background 
Although most of the big business faction had sup-
ported Herbert Hoover in the 1932 election, there were many 
prominent businessmen who had backed Roosevelt. With Roo se -
veltts election the measures enacted in the first few months, 
like the reopening of the banks and the cutback in govern-
ment spending, strengthened his conservative support . 1 We 
must remember, however, that the sentiments for big business 
in the United States at this time were not high. It s claim 
to national leader ship had long since collapsed. Senate in-
quiries into stock exchange operations were showing that 
practically all of the important men in the financial world 
were guilty of unethical practices. The blame of the de-
pression was being laid on their shoulders . 
By 1933, few newspapers were interested in quoting 
the pronouncements of their fall en heroes, the business ty-
coons. Their columns were full of stories of ruined brokers 
who had committed suicide, industrial leaders who had fled 
the country in an attempt to avoid criminal prosecution (like 
1Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr . , The Coming of the New 
~(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959}, p. 423. 
0 103 
Harold Ickes' old Chicago enemy, utilities magnate Samuel 
Insull) and bankers who had been ejected in disgrace from 
positions of financial trust. These stories tended to under-
mine the popular confidence in the wisdom and integrity of 
businessmen as a class. 
The bankers and industrialists were themselves baf-
fled and discouraged by the financial crises and they looked 
to Roosevelt for leadership with much less protest than they 
would have displayed under ordinary circumstances . Bus iness-
men were grateful for the emergency measure s of the first 
"hundred Days" whereby the credit structure of the nation was 
salvaged. 1 
The period of good feeling between big business and 
the New Deal administration was brief, however. When the 
country emerged from the most critical phases of the de-
pression, the bankers and industrialists started the cry for 
less government control . As each New Deal legislation for 
regulation and reform took effect the host ility of the con-
servative business faction rose. 
While business drifted away from the administration, 
Roosevelt picked up support from other groups. Farmer s , re-
cognizing that they were being helped by the Agricultural Ad-
1oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Nelson M. Blake, Since 1900 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 500. 
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justment Act, backed the administration. Because of Section 
7a of the National Recovery Act, which ended a decline in 
union membership, labor leaders were enthusiastic about the 
New Deal. The improved relief situation resulted in support 
from the lower income groups . Although most radicals re-
mained critical, liberal and progressive journalists and poli-
ticians generally endorsed the New Deal policies. Roosevelt 
turned to more liberal advisers, like Ickes, who told the 
President to rely on labor and agriculture for support rather 
than on business, and to give as much attention to reform as 
to recovery. 1 
Conservative advisers and office-holders gradually 
faded out of the administration picture. Lewis Douglas, a 
businessman whom Roosevelt had appointed Budget Director, re-
signed because he disapproved of deficit financing. Conser-
vatives of the 11 brain trust 11 like Raymond Maley moved out and 
became critics of the New Deal . The administrator of the 
business-inspired National Recovery Administration, General 
Hugh Johnson, stayed on until the Supreme Court decision 
abolished his agency, but he was disturbed to see business 
and government part company . 2 
1Merle Curti, et al., An American History, Vol. II 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 533, 534. 
2Ibid. , p. 533. 
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Eventually, conservative opposition to the Roo sevelt 
Administration became better organized and active. Business 
associations and newspapers became critical of the New Deal. 
Their criticisms stressed the theme of individual liberty 
versus government contro l. The statements of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, now backed by big business, 
were similar in tone. The DuPonts and other wealthy indivi-
duals joined such anti-administration Democrat s as Al Smith 
in the Liberty League (organized to contest the Roosevelt 
candidacy in the 1936 presidential campaign). The politicians 
in these groups also talked of states 1 rights. Although the 
sentiment of the country was behind the Roo sevelt adminis-
tration (as evidenced by his overwhelming re-election in 1936) 
the criticisms of big business against the administration 
were matters that had to be attended to and answered. 
Ickes 1 Attitude Toward Big Business 
Since his reform battles in Chicago, Ickes had been 
an advocate of government ownership of utilities. His dis-
regard of the hallowed traditions of the American business 
community brought him into sharp conflict with many members 
of that group. He was considered to be a prominent member of 
the 11 radicals u in the Roosevelt administration. 1 
1Mont Judd Harmon, uHarold L. Icke s : A Case Study In 
New Deal Thought!! (unpublished Ph.D . dissertation, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, 1953), pp. 346, 347. 
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Ickes, however, did not have any theoretical ob-
jections to bigness in business. He was not an advocate of 
the Brandeis view that bigness in business was inherently 
bad. In fact, he said that bigness often meant additional 
. t. l economy ln opera lon. 
In addition to being a New Dealer, Ickes was an old 
Progressive. His fights against Insull and others 2 had in-
stil led in him a philosophy that unless government actively 
control s and regulates business activity, the public would be 
fleeced. 
Ickes also distrusted great wealth.3 He followed 
the views of the New Deal with respect to economic thought 
rather closely in that he was unimpressed by the 11 laissez-
faire 11 and "free enterpriself theories of the classical econ-
omics school. He called the laissez -faire philosophy a "de-
featist" one. The depression had reaffirmed his belief that 
if business were not regulated, it would bring the country 
to disaster . 4 
Therewas a social emphasis in Ickest philosophy since 
he felt that many people were not receiving a fair share of 
1Ibid . ' p. 347. 2see Chapter II 
3Raymond Maley, 11 The End of a Breathing Spell, 11 News 
Week, XII (October 31, 1938), P . 44. --
4Harold L. Ickes, The New Democracy (New York: w. w. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1934), p . 89. 
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the goods which were available. He believed that a fair sys-
tem would produce more economic equality. Although he did 
not normally advocate government ownership as such, he did 
not hesitate to do so if he believed that it was the best 
method of serving the public interest. 1 
Harold Ickes 1 criticisms of big business may be viewed 
in two parts . Foremost was the persuasion that he conveyed 
in which he stated his philosophy of what big business 1 re-
lation to government should be. There were then his criti-
cisms of big business which, although in conformance with 
his convictions, were a product of the Administration 1 s 
planned attacks on big business. The dividing line between 
these two areas is not c learly defined since much of what 
Ickes said about big business was in complete agreement with 
the sentiments of the rest of the Roosevelt Administration. 
Propagating His Philosophy 
Early in his career as Secretary of the Interior, 
Ickes defined his thoughts about big business and what he be-
lieved the New Deal Administration 1 s relationship to it 
should be. In a speech entitled 11 A New Social Order in the 
Making 11 delivered at the commencement exercises of Washing-
ton and Jefferson College on June 3, 1933 (and broadcast over 
1Mont Judd Harmon, 11 Harold L. Icke s : A Case Study In 
New Deal Thoughttt (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, 1953), p. 375. 
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a coast to coast radio network) he said: 
The arrogant and the ruthless have been caught up help-
less by the very machines they erected with their own 
hands. Rugged individualists are running to the govern-
ment in Washington begging the strong man there to give 
them more government in business to enable them to save 
something for themselves out of the wreckage that they 
so vJantonly brought about. . . . we must adhere to the 
policy of protecting the weak against the strong, of 
curbing overreaching and ruthless power, of assuring to 
all, both weak and strong, that equality of opportunitl 
which is the cornerstone of our American Civilization. 
Again and again he expressed to the public of the 
United States the idea that big business was 11 ruthless 11 and 
that if another depression was to be avoided, the government 
must be given the sanction to protect the 11 weak 11 from the 
11 strong 11 • The term 11 rugged individualist 11 was often used by 
him to characterize big business. By using it he sarcasti-
cally poked fun at the laissez -faire policy of government 
toward business and the 11 pioneer 11 philosophy of 11 every man 
for himself 11 • Here again was his use of a biting humor which 
penetrated to the core of his opponentst argument. 
In 1934, Ickes wrote The New Democracy in which he 
further expounded his philosophy by contrasting the Hoover 
Administration and the Roosevelt Administration. He con-
demned the Hoover regime for siding with big business and 
linked the 11 rugged individualists 11 with 11 peddlers of dope, 
kidnappers, bootleggers, grafters, cheaters, chislers, and 
1The New York Times, June 4, 1933, Part II, pp. l, 2. 
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lawbreakers of various sorts ." He said that the latter cate-
gory shared the 11 cynical 11 philosophy of the former. 1 
When Herbert Hoover charged that the Roo sevelt admin-
i stration was guilty of "economic regimentation 11 and re-
strictions of liberty, Ickes retorted that what Hoover meant 
was the 11 liberty of the exploiter" and that in talking about 
"economic regimentation 11 Hoover was 11 raising a straw man to 
be knocked down. 112 In his answer to Hoover, Ickes went on 
to say that the fight for liberty must continue so as to re-
turn it to the great masses of the people who had it taken 
from them by the 11 exploiters 11 • He asserted that those who 
were able to acquire large propertie s were best able to look 
after themselves and that the government hadn 1 t regimented 
anyone, but industry had . Appealing to the workers in plain-
spoken terms, he s aid: 11 Go into one of these big factories 
and see whether they regiment you or not. You have to push 
a lever all day long . "3 If we did not know that Icke s said 
these words, we might very easily attribute them to a labor 
agitator . 
Whenever he talked about big business, Icke s simpli-
1Ickes, The New Democracy, op. cit., p . 33 . 
2The New York Times, September 5, 1934, p. 15. 
3Ibid. 
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fied the situation and drew a picture of the citizens of the 
United States fighting with a few evil big businessmen. He 
portrayed the Roosevelt Administration as the savior of the 
masses, protecting them from the machinations of big business. 
His appeal was directed to the "common man". When-
ever he was confronted with what he felt was an evil of bus-
iness, he portrayed it as a cheating of the common man . 
When, for example, the cement industry made a pricing 
agreement and increased the cost of the cement for the Boul-
der Dam construction, Ickes charged that the cement industry 
had formed a "trust" and that the increase in price was re-
tarding the government program of public works. Talking to 
the common man he said, 11 The more we give to the cement trust 
the less we have for labor . rrl 
When the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
criticized the Administration, Icke s stated that their cri-
ticism represented "the selfish faction of big business in 
the United States. "2 He asserted that the Chamber of Commerce 
was dominated by the rrwall Street interest rr that operated on 
the theory of 11 dog eat dog " and 11 may the devil take the hind-
most rr. 3 
1The New York Time s, May 6, 1933, p. l. 
2The New York Times, May 29, 1935, p. 10. 
3rbid. 
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In 1935, before the Town Hall audience in Detroit, 
Ickes delivered a speech entitled "What of Tomorrow? 11 • In 
lll 
this speech he called the opponents of the Administration 
the "cruelly-ruthless exploiting class" who looked for a re-
turn to power s o that it would be possible for them to grow 
even richer while the masses became poorer and poorer. He 
said that a deliberate effort wa s being made to induce peo-
ple to believe that communism constituted a threat. He warned 
that it was not communism that really posed a threat, but 
the "Fascist-minded " men of America who, through their soli-
darity, ability and willingness, desired to turn the wealth 
of America against the welfare of America. 1 
Again in a feature article concerned with govern-
ment i s relation to business, Ickes maintained that the gov-
ernment was not organized for the particular and exclusive 
benefit of any one class but for "self-protection" from foes 
from without and from exploitation from within by the ll sel-
fish and the ruthless". He accused big business of throwing 
fiFa sc i st and Communist mudll at the administration. In talk-
ing about the 1929 depre ss ion he mentioned "industrial Simon 
Legreesfl and "rugged individualistsfl who controlled govern-
ment at that time and how the Roosevelt administration took 
over in 1932 with the purpose of repairing the fldikes 11 in or-
1The New York Times, December 5 1935 ll 
' ' p. . 
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der to hold back the "floods" that were threatening to over-
whelm the nation . 1 
Ickes' persuasion in this area had many elements of 
the fostering of class hatred and conflict. There were cer-
tainly some people who accused him of doing this . 2 To be 
sure, many of his statements about big business pictured 
that group as the rich and powerful class who exploited the 
poor by fighting greedily for low wages and long hours. 
Ickes' Part in the Planned Attack 
on Big Business 
In late 1936 and early 1937, production in the Uni-
ted States ' industries was ri sing along with commodity pri-
ces and the stock market was bouyant. The administration 
feared that the country might be entering upon a period of 
wild speculation like that of the late twenties and it shift-
ed abruptly to deflationary policies. Work Projects Admin-
i strat ion rolls were greatly reduced, economy wa s put into 
effect in government departments and the balancing of the 
budget , within the year, was planned.3 
After August 1937, however, the s ituation altered 
lThe New York Times Magazine, February 2, 1936, p . 1. 
2
"Preaching Class Hatred," Business Week, March 21, 
1936, p. 52. 
3Barck, Jr. and Blake, op. cit ., p . 580. 
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radically . Industrial production declined and prices fell. 
Once again unemployment became a serious problem. As bus-
iness grew worse, a unanimous chorus of the opponents of 
the Administration blamed the New Deal. Subsequently, Pres-
ident Roosevelt was persuaded, by Benjamin Cohen and Thomas 
Corcoran, to permit a campaign to be launched to shift the 
blame of the recession on business and to renew attacks 
against industrial leaders. 1 
A council of war was called in the office of Robert 
H. Jackson, a lawyer of the Justice Department, with Cohen 
and Corcoran . The plan was to blame the depression on the 
monopolies and tt go after them 11 • 2 
Jackson was a well - known personality and was there-
fore assigned to make speeches. Statistics concerning con-
centration of wealth were gathered and speeches based on 
them were written . 
The first Jackson address was delivered on December 
11, 1936, before a consumers group in New York and the second 
on December 13, before the Farm Bureau in Chicago. Both 
were considered failure s by the New Dealers because of Jack-
1Mary Earhard Dillon, Wendell Willkie, (New Yo r k : J . 
B. Lippincott Company, 1952), p . 108. 
2Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, Men Around the 
President, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 
1938 ), p . 32 . 
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son ' s mild language and the lack of epithets . 1 A new offen-
sive was therefore started by the group. Ample radio dates 
were available because the President, some time earlier, had 
asked Corcoran and Steve Early to see what they could do 
about getting more time on the air for the Administration. 
Corcoran had a large acquaintance among radio men s ince they 
went to him whenever they wanted a New Deal speaker . 2 When 
the word had been passed that more radio hours were wante d, 
the hours were granted . This was partly as a result of the 
popularity of Corcoran among the radio men and also of their 
fear of the Federal Communications Commission . 3 
The day before Chr istmas was chosen for a debate be-
tween a businessman and a New Dealer. Since Jackson was too 
judicious in expressing himself, Cohen and Corcoran wrote a 
speech which was quite strong. At the last moment it was 
revealed that the businessman who was to take the other side 
of the debate had reneged. Cohen and Corcoran, thinking that 
Jackson was to debate had pitched the speech extra strong 
but now they decided that it was not strong enough . Accord-
ingly they added epithets to fill the time. 4 
The speech was delivered and it created quite a lot 
of excitement in the press . Since it was important that 
1Ibid., p. 134. 2Ibid . 
3Ibid. 4Ibid . , p. 135 . 
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Jackson rs speech should not seem to be an isolated utterance 
but part of a general opinion, Corcoran and Cohen visited 
Ickes to persuade him to join the attack. Ickes, usually 
always willing to give a speech, at first expressed the opin-
ion that perhaps he had been doing too much speaking but he 
finally gave in at the insistance of Cohen and Corcoran. He 
had been reading Ferdinand Lundberg 1 s book: America 1 s Sixty 
Familie s (whose thesis was that sixty families controlled 
the wealth of America and constituted a type of plutocracy) 
and he reminded Cohen and Corcoran of the succes s which Leon 
Blum had had in France with his assault on the 11 deus cent 
families 11 (the two hundred families owning voting stock in 
the Banque de France). 1 
On December 30, 1937, Icke s went on a national radio 
network with a speech entitled: 11 It Is Happening Here 11 (al-
luding to the dictatorship of Hitler then threatening Europe). 
The first draft had been written by Corcoran and Cohen with 
amendment s by Clark Foreman, Icke s 1 special counsel. Ickes 
had then dictated his own draft base d on the Corcoran and 
Cohen contribution. 2 
In this speech Ickes said that the governmentrs pro-
posed anti-trust fight was a "battle to the finishn between 
1Ibid., pp. 135, 136. 
2Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, p. 283. 
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plutocracy, which he characterized as 11 America 1 s sixty fam-
ilies11 (derived from the Ferdinand Lundberg book) and demo-
cracy, which he represented as being the nation's 11 120, 000,000 
people 11 . He asserted that big business had gone on a s it-
down strike to force the government to yield to its demands 
for a 11 Hands Off 11 policy. The forces behind the attack on 
the administration, Ickes said, were in reality just a few 
businessmen, who through some 200 corporations, controlled 
American business. He then said that unless the people called 
the bluff of big business to go on a sit -down strike of non-
operation and non-employment of capital, a 11 Big-Business Fas-
cist America--an enslaved America 11 , would be the answer. 
He alluded to Italy's Mussolini and went on to comment that 
the same struggle that was happening elsewhere was occurring 
in the United States; a struggle for power, for control of 
lives, labor and possessions of whole peoples. 1 
Ickes then remarked that in America the struggle had 
come into the open. This struggle, he declared, had been 
renewed after the Administration 11 bailed out 11 business in 
1933 from a situation into which, he said, it had plunged 
into through its own 11 short-sighted 11 policy. After the gov-
ernment had restored prosperity to the corporations, Ickes 
related, these corporations had once again reopened their 
lThe New York Times, December 31, 1937, p. 1. 
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fight for further control of economic wealth and this, he 
went on, had actually grown to the point of attempting to 
dictat e their ownterms to the government. He said that after 
the government had decreased its expenditure of relief funds 
in response to pleas of business, the 11 sixty families " began 
to run the stock market up and then down, and did little or 
nothing to increase the purchasing power of the consumers 
so that they could buy goo ds at artificially increased pri-
res. Ickes added that these sixty families began to make 
threats and demands on President Roosevelt to restore to .bus-
iness the " suicidal license" that it had enjoyed in 1929. 
To the 120,000,000 people of the United States they have 
made the threat that the professional operators of the 
American economic system and the professional managers 
of the capital funds of the United States (capital to 
which every American man and woman over four generations 
has cont ributed sweat and blood) will refuse to operate 
that economic system, will refuse to let that capital 
be employed, unle ss they are once more given full p~wer 
to wreck Americ an democracy in their own sweet way. 
Ickes continued by commenting that those who tried to 
make it appear that Pre s ident Roo sevelt was fighting business 
used the word "business " with a special meaning. When they 
spoke of "businessmen", he said, they referred to a small 
group of big business monopolists . He asserted that these 
were the people whose power President Roosevelt challenged 
during his first administration and who se power he was deter-
lIb i d . , p . 6 . 
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mined to master during his second administration for the good 
of the people. Concentrated wealth and power in the hands 
of a few was just as dangerous then as it had been in times 
past when people fought power and wealth in~der to preserve 
their own human right, he added . 
Ickes also said that he was unwilling to choose be-
tween fascism and communism because each was incompatible 
with democracy and free, individual enterprise. He charac-
terized the struggle as one between the New Deal and the 
"Sixty Familie s " who had brought the rest of businessmen of 
the United States under the "terror of their domination . 111 
Allying his cause with that of respected status syrn-
bols, he asserted that Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abra-
ham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had been 
denounced in much the same terms by 11 business tycoons 11 as 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was being denounced then. Ickes ended 
by making a reference to a member of the DuPont family who, 
he charged, had asked the government to 11stop changing rules 
of the game " (legi s lation against business). 2 
Afterwards , Ickes wrote in his private diary that he 
felt that the speech was a good one and one calculated to 
cause a great deal of discussion. He mentioned that he had 
received more telegrams following this speech than he ever 
lrbid . 
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had on any similar occasion and that the majority of them 
were critical. Analyzing this reaction, he commente d: 
I always feel that protestants are more likely to ex-
press themselves than those who agree, and people who 
feel that they can afford to send telegrams are likely 
to belong to those who would have less s~pathy with 
such view s as I expressed in this speech.l 
Nine days later, President Roosevelt made his Con-
gressional Message in which he was expected to '' back up 11 
Ickes and Jackson on the statements that they ha d made. In 
remarking on the sat i sfaction that he felt for the Presi -
dent's speech, Ickes said that he hadn't expected the Pre s -
ident to rrblast away rr like Jackson and himself had . He said: 
'~he theory was that Jackson and I were to lay down a heavy 
barrage under which the Pre s ident could advance.rr 2 Although 
he may have been sincere in everything that he said in his 
speech , Icke s obviously knew how to follow a plan of attack 
by playing a particular role in it . 
On January 8, 1938, along with five other members of 
the Roosevelt Cabinet speaking in different parts of the 
country, Ickes delivered a Jackson Day Dinner address in 
Nashville, Tennessee in which he again defended the practices 
of the New Deal. He drew a parallel between Andrew Jack-
son ' s battle with the Bank of the United States and Pre s i-
1Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. II, p . 284. 
2Ibid. , p. 287. 
dent Rooseveltts struggle with the "hydra-headed economic 
monster of 1938n. 1 
120 
In this speech, Ickes recounted how Jackson was ac-
cused of trampling the Constitution underfoot and that Nich-
olas Biddle, head of the bank which Jefferson held to threat-
en the economic welfare of the people, used his wealth and 
financial power to bring panic upon the country. Talking 
about Biddle he said: HHis vas a policy of rule or ruin, 
just as this has been the policy of our economic overlords 
of more recent times. 112 Here again, Ickes was using a 
technique of transferring the evils of a past era to those 
he was attacking . 
Once more referring to the Lundberg book, Ickes said 
that the reviling of leaders like Jackson and President Roo-
sevelt was always to be expected from those who feel such 
leadership threatens to break the ngrip". He added that 
such abuses rose to their ultimate when a man (Roosevelt) 
who was born to nthe purple" found his sympathies responding 
to "human wrongs''. Concluding, Ickes said that this nwarn 
had been waged since the beginning of the world and that it 
was one which would probably continue until the end of time. 3 
On February 22, 1938, Ickes broadcast a speech to 
1The New York Times, January 9, 1938, p. 2. 
2Ibid. 3Ibid. 
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the British Empire entitled ttDemo cracy or What 11 • This speech 
had been approved by the President over objections made by 
the State Department. In it, Ickes said that the people of 
America believed that the democratic principles upon which 
their institutions were founded would never be submerged, by 
facism or communism, if there was a degree of 11 e conomic jus-
tice 11 which the great mass of the people were entitled to 
as a right. He also referred to tteconomic royaliststt (his 
label for big businessmen) and allied them with ttpolitical 
diehardstt. 1 
In the last phase of the campaign against big bus-
iness, Ickes delivered a speech in Chicago at the Chicago 
Jewish Daily Courier dinner. In this speech, entitled 11 Pro-
gress by Purges 11 , he remarked that the real threat in the 
country was fascism, which he called a 11 ruthless political 
monster 11 that hunted by day and prowled by night. 2 Here he 
was again referring to big business and making a comparison 
with its power and the power of Hitler and Mussolini. 
Conclusion 
Harold Ickes certainly did not lack the qualities 
required to wage an effective battle against big business . 
1The New York Times, February 23, 1938, p. l. 
2The New York Times, April 4, 1938, p. 2. 
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As evidenced by his excoriation of a group of business exec-
utives at the Economic Club of New York, he was not afraid 
to face his opponent. 
It must be noted here, however, that Ickes objected 
less to big business, as an institution, than he did to big 
businessmen. He liked a personal fight and a personal vil-
lain to attack. He assumed that it was men who created 
ideas and who sometimes used those ideas to sanction acts 
detrimental to the public. From his Progressive and muck-
raking past, he carried the tendency to personalize the fight 
against those whom his idol, Theodore Roosevelt, called the 
"malefactors of great wealth". 
-
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Harold L. Ickes was a unique personality in the New 
Deal era . In many ways he was a non-conformist . Many times 
he did not follow the dictates of convention because he felt 
the conventional was often wrong . 
Harold Ickes was a man with a mission. He constituted a 
committee of one which had the purpose of improving the 
nation and the world and he sail ld into his task with 
flailing fists and an iron will. 
Although he was known to be grim and unyielding when 
he was out to achieve a particular goal, he also had the re -
putation of being one of the sharpest wits in Washington. 
When he was crossing the rough water s of the Chesapeake Bay 
in a launch to board the cruiser Indianapoli s for a meeting 
with the President, he got slightly seasick. He then swore 
that he would never again go on a boat. He said: 11 I 1 ll die 
for my President, but I won't get seasick for him. " Later, 
when he remembered that he ranked seventh in cabinet stand-
ing accor ding to protocol, he asked if in the case of an ac -
cident those riding in the launch would be rescued according 
to rank . 2 
1Mont Judd Harmon, "Harold L. Icke ~ : A Case Study In 
New Deal Thought" (unpublished Ph . D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, 1953), p. 1. 
2I bid. , p. 2. 
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As has been seen, Ickes often used this sense of hu-
mor to take pokes at his opponents. For instance, when walk-
i ng through the Commerce Building with Attorney-General Homer 
Cummings he suggested that someone call Herbert Hoover to 
find out how to 11 get out of his building .rr l 
Allie d with this sense of humor, ]kes also had the 
ability to invent extremely descriptive phrases . This com-
binat i on of humor and invective made him a favorite subject 
for the press. This was an asset to him in his many politi -
cal battles . He referr e d to Wendell Willkie as rr the simple, 
barefoot, Wall Street lawyer rr; to Thomas Dewey as the "can-
didate in sneakers 11 ; to Huey Long as having 11 halitosis of the 
intellect rr ; to Hugh Johnson as having rr mental saddle s ores "; 
and Martin Dies as "Loaded Die s " . 
Ickes might be considere d a liberal, a progressive 
and even a revolutionist . Although he was an idealist in 
many ways, he buttressed this idealism with the practical 
politics which he had learned in his early Chicago battles . 
As the Secretary of the Interior he was a great administrator 
and he had the confidence and respect of t he President. 
When he first came upon the national scene he was an 
unknown. This was quickly changed, however . As Ernest Lind-
ley wrote : 11 Mr. I ckes was the one real dark horse of the Cab-
------------------------------------------------------------
1 Ibid. , p . 2. 
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inet. Within six months he was known as its strongest man." 1 
Icke s is also remembered for his fights in the cause 
of civil liberties. Throughout his lifetime he constantly 
denounced intolerance. He was outspoken in his defense of 
the equal rights of negroes and in his capacity as a govern-
ment administrator he placed many negroes in positions to 
which their capacities entitled them. In 1939 he said: "More 
and more, the guarantee s of civil liberties that are avail-
able in no other land and to which minorities in this coun-
try have looked for protection depend for real effectiveness 
upon the full use of the affirmative powers given for gov-
ernment to safeguard the life of the nation. 112 
Ickes also fought for equal rights for the Jewish 
minorities. He berated the Nazis for their t reatment of the 
Jews and he urged a more liberal immigration policy so that 
dispossessed Jews could enter the United States in greater 
numbers. In 1940 he was awarded the Louis D. Brandeis Medal 
for service to humanity. In accepting the medal Icke s des-
cribed anti-Semitism as more than a Jewish problem; he felt 
that it constituted a danger to the whole society that sane -
lErnest Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution, First 
Phase, (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1933), p. 60. 
2Harold L. Ickes, "The Crisis of Democracy," National 
Education Association Journal, XXVIII (February, 1939), p. 
5Lf. 
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tioned it. He said that it was an instrument in the hands of 
the unscrupulous who used it to divert the minds of the pub-
lie from a plan to enslave all the people. 
In Germany half a million Jews felt the mailed fi st at 
the beginning. Then 70,000,000 non-Jews found them-
selves exposed to privation and compelled to indure suf-
fering. Today the whole German nation stands at the 
brink of an abyss.l 
Another phase of Ickes 1 fight for civil liberties 
concerned the communist 11 witch-hunting 11 which has been so 
prevelant in our recent American history. His disputes with 
Martin Dies, then chairman of the House Special Committee on 
Un-American Activitie s, are of particular note. When Dies 
''disclosed'' that Icke s was a member of a 11 subversive commu-
nist front organization 11 , the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Icke s called Dies a 11 publicity seeker 11 and a sensationalist 
who made ridiculous charges only to keep in the public eye. 2 
Writing about Dies in his Autobiography Ickes said: 
For his unmitigated gall, for his long-winded yammer-
ings that seemingly go 11 babbling 11 on forever, and for 
the strange power that he appears to have over Congress, 
I christen him 11 Bubble Dancer" Die s , who cavorts lumber-
ingly on the Congressional stage with nothing but a toy 
balloon with which to hide his intellectual nudity . To 
my mind, the most contemptible human being in public life 
is the one who will recklessly smear another's character 
lHarold L. Ickes; address accepting the Louis D. 
Brandeis Metal, Jewish Forum, New York City, April 14, 1940. 
Reprinted, U.S. Congressional Record, 76th Gong ., 3rd Sess., 
LXXXVI, Part 14, p. 2396. 
2The New York Times, February 5, 1943, p. 13. 
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and the~ wrap himself tightly in his Congressional im-
munity. 
Years later when Senator Jo seph McCarthy was carry-
ing on his investigations, Ickes urged the Unite d States Sen-
ate to expel McCarthy. When this advice was not heeded, 
Ickes said that the Senate had a too "strong st omach 11 for 
its own good. He added: 11 The Senate may gag at him and reach 
for a bottle of medicine, but it will not belch him forth as 
it should to maintain its own dignity and prestige. 112 
In~ article in The New Republic in 1950, Ickes said 
that McCarthy was a more dangerous subversive than even the 
communists for whom he professed to be searching . 
His is the raucous voice of a Goebbels. The master liar 
of Germany never served Hitler to a better effect than 
McCarthy is now serving the Communists. He is a great -
er danger to our American institutions than the Commun-
ists in this country could be even if they were multi -
plied a hundred times . 3 
Probably most important to the present study is 
Ickes r concern for freedom of the press. For a longtime, it 
was Ickes 1 position that the press in the United States was 
either controlled by big business or was itself so integral 
1Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon 
(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943 ) , p. 298. 
2Harold L. Ickes, 11 McCarthy v. Pearson, " The New Re-
public, CXXIV (January l, 1951), p. 18 . 
3Haro l d L. Ickes, 11 A Decoration for McCarthy, 11 The 
New Republic, CXXII (April 10, 1950), p. 17 . ...---
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a part of big business that the areas in which free expression 
could prevail were severly restricted. In a telegram to the 
New York Newspaper Women's Club he said: 
Freedom of the press includes not only the right of the 
press to be free, but also the right of the people, from 
whom the press receives its constitutional guarantee, to 
be free of a predatory press. The press, if it is to 
be worthy of the freedom thus bestowed, must be free of 
any and all alliances which might prevent it from ful-
filling the duty it owes a democratic people. 1 
In these words, Ickes pointed out that a press which 
is free of government control is not in reality free if other 
controls are imposed from any sources whatsoever. He felt 
that the profit motive created hazards for the publishers of 
America. I n his book Freedom of the Press Today he did not 
recommend that measures be taken to eliminate profit but he 
called upon the press to avoid being guided only by the dic -
tates of the ncounting roomn . He said that it was difficult 
for any publisher with a ncountry clubn vision to be im-
partial in his handling of the news .2 
It was Ickes' view that the press is affected with a 
public interest. He had no objection to private owner-
ship and did not suggest that the government should en-
ter the publishing field . He did want the press to re-
cognize that it had a moral obligation to the public 
which it served, and that it should fulfill that obli-
gation by presenting news in an impartial and factual 
1The New York Times, October 6, 1941, p . 14 . 
2Harold L. Ickes, (compiler) Freedom of the Press 
Today (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1941), p. 8. 
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manner in so far as that was possible. 1 
When the Wall Street Journal stated that since a 
newspaper was a private enterprise, it was not vested with 
any public interest, Ickes said that this was an open de-
claration by the press that it could, if it chose, be used 
as a propaganda medium for only the "preferred class". He 
said that this power could be med to make people "pawns" in 
the hands of men whose ideology was "a well filled purse." 2 
In his book America's House of Lords Ickes said that 
the American people were in a dilemma. He declared: 
We cannot control the press without losing our essential 
liberties, and yet our newspapers ... are often out of 
sympathy with, and have different interests from, the 
majority of the people. Our free press--free, that is, 
from governmental regulation and control--is, with few 
exceptions, owned by men of property who naturally are 
more interested in private profits than in public wel-
fare. And since democracy cannot exist without a fair 
and public-spirited press, the grave question is raised 
of how to reconcile private profit with public interest. 
in other words how can we make our newspapers honest 
servants of a democratic society . 3 
In the preceding chapters we have viewed six stra-
tegic areas of Harold L. Ickes 1 philosophy of persuasion in 
in terms of his development as a politician. We have also 
1Harmon, op. cit ., p . 392 . 
2Harold L. Ickes, America's House of Lords (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), p . x. 
3Ibid., p. 8. 
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viewed these six strategic areas operating in three "case 
histories'' : Conservation, Big Business and the Public Works 
Administration. 
Ultimately, we must judge Ickes ' propaganda philos-
ophy on two criteria : (1) Did he propagate ideas which he 
felt were beneficial to the people he was serving and (2) did 
he use techniques of persuasion which helped the public make 
rational decisions? 
Although his secret diary gives some insight into the 
mind of Harold L. Ickes , it is difficult to ascertain his 
inner motives conclusively. From what evidence we have, how-
ever, we must say that his ethics were unquestionable . Will-
iam Scott Nobles in his analysis of Ickes ' public speaking 
in the 1936 campaign comments : 
As a public official and as a man, "honest Harold" Ickes 
had an excellent and well - deserved reputation for sound 
ethical values. Interviews with Ickes' associates re-
veal a deep-rooted conviction of his honesty and inte-
grity . Others, even some who feuded with the Secretary, 
have generally acknowledged his honesty . Hugh Johnson, 
who had disagreed bitterly with Ickes upon occasion 
said that whatever else might be said of him "nobody 
had impugned his integrity." . . No serious question 
seems to raise about the genuineness of Ickes' "con-
cern for human welfare . " He was a progressive by con-
viction and supported many losing and hopeless causes 
for that conviction . l 
1. Willian Scott Nobles, "A Rhetorical Study of the 
Public Speaking of Harold L. Ickes in the 1936 Presidential 
Campaign" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, 1955), pp . 257, 258 . 
·-
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However, as Nobles also points out, we must question 
the degree of nintellectual honestyn which is shown in Ickes' 
persuasional efforts. Although he sincerely believed that 
important i ssue s should be taken to the public for a decision, 
his appeals to this public were, to a great extent, emotion-
al and biased . Because of this emotionality he often dis-
torted the true situation and attacked individuals ra ther 
than principles. 
When we consider the integrity of his beliefs, Ickes 
cannot be condemned for these flaws in his propaganda. He 
was an independent spirit, a former Republican who revolted 
against the party dictates and left for the Democratic ranks 
and an administrator with friends and enemies on both sides 
of the fence. Hi s principles transcended party lines . He 
fought Republican and Democrat alike to achieve his goals. 
It i s significant that Theodore Roosevelt wa s the 
hero for Harold Ickes since "T. R." was the perfect image of 
the political fighter who continually fought against all odds 
to achieve what he thought was beneficial to the Uni ted Sta-
tes citizenry . Harold L. Icke s carried on that tradition . 
What Theodore Roosevelt said when he was shot at the Pro-
gressive "Bull Moose" Party convention in 1912 could very 
well have come from the lips of the indefatigable I ckes : 
nThere is a bulle t in my body ... . But it takes more than 
r 
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that to kill a Bull Moose. 111 Harold L. Ickes suffered from 
many verbal 11 bullets 11 in his lifetime but that did not pre-
vent him from always voicing his opinions and beliefs. 
1Roger Butterfield, The American Past (New York: Si-
mon and Schuster, 1957), p. 345. 
--
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Wallace: I have felt that divisions of functions between 
departments cannot be solved entirely on the basis of logic. 
A division of functions as nearly reasonab+e as possible 
would seem to me to be feasible only if based on the natural 
division of our resources between the inorganic and the or-
ganic . The organic resources are, of course, those which 
have to do with growth from the soil, plant and animal life. 
These would seem to fall .quite naturally into the Department 
of Agriculture. The administration of these resources, of 
course, in some cases has a definite bearing upon conser-
vation. Indeed many of the bureaus of the Department of Ag-
riculture are engaged in many phases of conservation, among 
them the Bureau of Biological Survey, Forest Service, and 
Soil Conservation Service. The theme of conservation runs 
through the activities of other bureaus of the Department in-
creasingly so in the case of the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration, and steadily in the work carried out by the 
bureaus engaged in scientific research, experimentation, and 
demonstration . 
The question in my mind is to what extent the fact of the 
name would be mandatory or semimandatory, and I am assured 
by certain individuals here that it would not in any degree 
be mandatory, but it would seem to me the mere fact of the 
name would indicate the intent of Congress. There seems to 
be a difference of opinion on that. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ickes : Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I find these continued 
hearings increasingly interesting. The ground shifts from 
meeting to meeting. New objections are raised. Old ob-
jections are abandoned or semiabandoned. When we started out 
we had to meet the very forcibly presented argument which was 
1Hearings to Change Name of Department of the Inter-
ior to the Department of Conservation and Works. Committee 
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, U. S. House, 
74th Cong., lst Sess., (Washington : U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1935), pp. 70, 71, 83, 84. 
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way beyond my depth, in which I find myself beyond my depth, 
bearing on the question of the name. We had to go into ab-
struse questions of entomology, and very much to my conster -
nation and surprise I found the use of the word conservation 
was something subversive of our institutions; it was manda-
tory, the mere use of the word, although the bill in explicit 
terms gave authority to the President to investigate and put 
into effect a recommendation which was subject to review of 
the Congress. Today I am gratified to learn that while the 
terms of the bill are not mandatory they are merely semiman-
datory. Perhaps at the next hearing, if there is a next 
hearing, we will find that there is nothing mandatory about 
it at all, something that I think everybody except the Depart-
ment of Agriculture discovered on the first reading of the 
bill. 
This bill, we are given to understand, cannot be solved 
merely on the basis of logic. At the last hearing we heard 
a great deal about logic. Today we hear about logic but some 
sort of qualified logic the exact phaseology I did not hear. 
As I understand the logic or quasi-logic employed in the ar-
gument on this bill, we are to be logical when we judge its 
terms with reference to the Department of the I nterior, but 
we can amend our logic or forget our logic when it comes to 
the Department of Agriculture. Logic is an engaging term. 
I would like to discuss this for a moment, if I may be per-
mitted, with reference to the Department of Agriculture. I 
want to apply it to the language that we are confronted with 
here, organic and inorganic . Certain inorganic functions are 
properly those of the Department of Agriculture, we are told, 
and certain organic functions, and these we must be logical, 
should be in the Department of the Interior. I norganic 
functions. I s the building of roads organic or an inorganic 
function? We have heard that the fore sts ought to remain in 
Agriculture because it is a growing crop . Do roads grow? 
Do they have to be plowed under? They do sometimes, yes. Do 
we take crops from them and put them in the barn? I s the 
Weather Bureau organic or inorganic? Does the weather grow? 
Is the regulation of speculation on the boards of trade or-
ganic or inorganic? Does that grow? Following it to a logi-
cal conclusion--I like occasionally to be logical myself, if 
life belongs under Agriculture, I mean the fowls and the 
beasts and the fishes--they have not got the fishes; they 
have to reach out and get them because they are inorganic, 
but for wildlife generally, if the Department of Agriculture 
logically is to have control over wildlife, then we ought to 
have control over human life as some of that is wildlife oc-
casionally. Such an argument would give greater exigency to 
the claim of the Department of Agriculture to extend its sway 
to the domain of human affairs. 
-----
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